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During the early 1980s, the defined benefit pension plans maintained
by many defense contractors became significantly overfunded. The pen-
sion surplus resulted primarily from the unexpectedly robust growth of
the stock market, and to a lesser extent from the shrinking defense indus-
try workforce, dampened wage inflation for salaried employees below
the corporate executive level, funding requirements imposed by the Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, and govern-
ment contracting regulations.1 During this same period, some contrac-
tors terminated their defined benefit pension plans in order to gain
access to the plans' surplus funds.' The Government, in turn, began a
concerted effort to recover what it viewed as its "equitable share" of the
surplus funds.3
At first, the Government limited its claims for surplus pension assets to
plan terminations that resulted in a reversion of plan assets to the con-
tractor. The Government based its claims on then-existing Armed Serv-
ices Procurement Regulation (ASPR) and Defense Acquisition Regula-
tion (DAR) provisions and contract clauses, including, in particular, the
Credits provision, the Allowable Cost, Fixed Fee and Payment clause
(now called the Allowable Cost and Payment clause), and the Incentive
Price Revision clause. Next, the Government sought to protect its share
in the reversions by attempting to negotiate advance agreements with
contractors, or by including special savings clauses in negotiated con-
tracts. Now, after a series of increasingly aggressive amendments to the
Karen L. Manos is a partner in the Washington, D.C. office of Howrey & Simon.
1. See Cost Accounting Standards Bd. Staff Discussion Paper, Accounting for Fully-
Funded Defined Benefit Pension Plans, at 4-5, 8 (Aug. 19, 1991).
2. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, REPORT No.
APO 93-011, REPORT ON DEP'T OF DEFENSE OVERSIGHT OF DEFENSE CONTRACTOR
PENSION PLANS i, 2 (1993).
3. See Eric J. Zahler & Terry E. Miller, Critical Pension Cost Accounting Issues, 90-5
CP&A REP. 3, 4 (1990).
4. See id. at 4; see also DEFENSE CONTRACT AUDIT AGENCY, U.S. DEP'T OF
DEFENSE, 1 DCAA CONTRACT AUDIT MANUAL, 7-606.1(f), at 746, 7-606.3a, at 746
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Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) cost principles and Cost Ac-
counting Standards (CAS or Standards) provisions, the Government has
several alternatives upon which to assert claims to contractors' accumu-
lated pension surpluses.
The stakes are potentially huge: the pension plans maintained by de-
fense contractors account for a sizeable portion of the estimated $2 tril-
lion in pension assets currently held in defined benefit pension plans.5
Indeed, since the mid-1980s many of the largest defense contractors have
had billions of dollars of surplus pension assets.' Potential government
claims for surplus pension assets can exceed, in some cases, the value of a
business unit, thus hindering corporate restructuring.
This article examines the alternative bases upon which the Govern-
ment may assert a claim for surplus pension assets and discusses legal ar-
guments that may be available to defend against such claims. It con-
cludes with an analysis of potential strategies for avoiding, limiting, or
delaying government claims to surplus pension assets.
II. BACKGROUND
Applicable laws and regulations generally consider the costs of con-
tractor contributions to employee pension plans "allowable" costs for
government contracting purposes; the costs may be reimbursed under a
contractor's cost-reimbursement contracts and used in the pricing of
fixed-price contracts. There are two basic types of pension plans to
which contractors may make contributions: the defined contribution plan
and the defined benefit plan. Under a defined contribution pension plan,
the amount of the contractor's contribution is established in advance,
and the employees' benefits vary based on the pension plan's investment
(1989) (recommending use of "termination advance agreement[s]" to protect the Gov-
ernment against contractor decisions to terminate overfunded pension plans, which would
otherwise "result in a significant windfall profit [to the contractor] on firm-fixed-price con-
tracts"); Leonard Sloane, Pension Refund to Pentagon, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1986, at Dl
(reporting that the Defense Department is seeking "advance agreement[s] from all its
13,000 contractors that it will be reimbursed when fully funded plans are ended in the fu-
ture").
5. Cf. Mike Maharry, High Court to Hear Pension-fund Profit Case, Who Gets Pen-
sion Assets Totaling $2 Trillion? Workers or Companies?, NEWS TRIB., Nov. 2, 1998, at
C8; COST ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., DRAFT COST ACCOUNTING STANDARD ON
THE ADJUSTMENT AND ALLOCATION OF PENSION COSTS, at 23 (1976) ("In its research
on the development of ERISA, the Pension Task Force determined that whereas a great
many pension plans of companies engaged in commercial work were underfunded, the
opposite situation was prevalent for companies engaged primarily in Government work.
These plans were generally either fully-funded or over-funded.").
6. See Stuart Weiss, Fat Pension Funds Can Make Companies Tempting Targets,
BUS. WK., Nov. 10, 1986, at 106 (tracking the pension plan surpluses of large companies).
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experience. 7 By contrast, under a defined benefit pension plan, the bene-
fits, or basis for determining the benefits, to be paid are established in
advance, and the contractor makes contributions in an amount actuari-
ally determined necessary to pay the required benefits as they become
due.8 The actuarial assumptions used in determining the amount of the
contractor's contribution commonly include such factors as the interest
rate at which the pension assets will grow, mortality rates, retirement
age, compensation levels, and employee turnover.
To be tax deductible, a contractor's pension contributions must be
made to a qualified pension trust, established for the exclusive benefit of
the employees and their beneficiaries.9 Except for withdrawals permitted
to pay current retiree medical expenses under section 420 of the Internal
Revenue Code ("IRC 420 transfers"),' ° the contractor may not, without
terminating the plan, either withdraw or divert the pension assets before
satisfying all of the plan's liabilities to employees and their beneficiar-
ies. 1 Terminating a pension plan without establishing a qualified re-
placement plan or increasing the employees' accrued benefits subjects
the contractor to a 50% excise tax' 2-plus corporate income tax at a rate
of up to 35%1 3 -on the assets withdrawn.
The amount of pension cost charged to a contractor's government con-
tracts for a defined benefit pension plan is necessarily based on an esti-
mate, as are many other costs of contract performance, such as the costs
of materials, fuel, and labor. Consequently, the contractor's actual cost
experience may be higher or lower than the amount originally antici-
pated. Whether the contractor's actual cost experience affects the
amount paid under the contract typically depends on the type of con-
tract.
Government contracts may be grouped broadly into two categories:
fixed-price contracts and cost-reimbursement contracts. 14 Between these
7. See 48 C.F.R. § 31.001 (1998); see also 26 U.S.C. § 414(i) (1994) (defining the term
"defined contribution plan" as "a plan which provides for an individual account for each
participant and for benefits based solely on the amount contributed to the participant's
account, and any income, expenses, gains and losses, and any forfeitures of accounts of
other participants which may be allocated to such participant's account").
8. See 48 C.F.R. § 31.001 (defining a defined-benefit pension plan).
9. See 26 U.S.C. § 401(a) (1994).
10. See id. § 420(a).
11. See id. § 401(a)(2).
12. See id. § 4980(d)(1) (calling for a tax increase for an employer who fails to estab-
lish a replacement plan or a plan providing increased benefits).
13. See id. § 11(b)(1)(D).
14. See 48 C.F.R. § 16.101(b) (1998).
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two extremes are other types of so-called flexibly priced contracts, such
as price-redetermination and incentive contracts, that may include fea-
tures of both fixed-price and cost-reimbursement contracts. Federal Ac-
quisition Regulation (FAR) 16.202-1 provides that the price of a firm-
fixed-price (FFP) contract "is not subject to any adjustment on the basis
of the contractor's cost experience in performing the contract."' 5 Rather,
a FFP contract "places upon the contractor maximum risk and full re-
sponsibility for all costs and resulting profit or loss.,,16 Cost-
reimbursement contracts, on the other hand, provide for the payment of
the contractor's allowable incurred costs and a pre-established, fixed
fee. 7 For contracts with commercial organizations, the FAR cost princi-
ples are used to determine whether costs are reimbursable under cost-
reimbursement and other flexibly-priced government contracts.
One of the more significant features of the cost principles is the Credits
provision, which has been a part of the ASPR, DAR, and FAR since the
early 1950s.'9 The FAR cost principles, including the Credits provision,
are applicable to cost-reimbursement contracts through inclusion in a
contract of the Allowable Cost and Payment clause;0 to redetermination
contracts through inclusion of the Price Redetermination clause;21 and to
incentive contracts through inclusion of the Incentive Price Revision
22clause. When applicable, the Credits provision requires the contractor
to give the Government a credit, by cost reduction or cash refund, of
"[t]he applicable portion of any income, rebate, allowance, or other
credit relating to any allowable cost" that the contractor either receives
or accrues. Echoing this requirement, the Allowable Cost and Payment
clause,24 which has been a part of the ASPR, DAR, and FAR since 1953,
requires the contractor to "pay to the Government any refunds, rebates,
15. Id. § 16.202-1.
16. Id.
17. See id. § 16.301-1 (providing a general description of cost-reimbursement con-
tracts).
18. See id. § 31.103.
19. See 32 C.F.R. § 15-201.5 (1981) (identifying the DAR Credits provision);
48 C.F.R. § 31.201-5 (1998) (explaining the FAR Credits provision).
20. See 48 C.F.R. § 52.216-7 (1998) (Allowable Cost and Payment clause (Apr. 1998)).
21. See id. §§ 52.216-5, 52.216-6 (Price Redetermination-Prospective Clause and
Price Redetermination- Retroactive Clause, respectively (Oct. 1997)).
22. See id. § 52.216-16 (governing firm targets); see also id. § 52.216-17 (addressing
successive targets).
23. Id. § 31.201-5.
24. Originally named the Allowable Cost, Fixed Fee, and Payment clause, and subse-
quently renamed the Allowable Cost, Fee, and Payment Clause, before being given its cur-
rent name, Allowable Cost and Payment.
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credits, or other amounts (including interest, if any) accruing to or re-
ceived by the Contractor or any assignee under [the] contract, to the ex-
tent that those amounts are properly allocable to costs for which the
Contractor has been reimbursed by the Government.,
25
Moreover, with respect to cost-reimbursement contracts, the Govern-
ment's rights under the Credits provision are plainly intended to survive
final contract payment. The Allowable Cost and Payment clause requires
contractors, as a condition of receiving final payment, to execute an as-
signment of such amounts allocable to costs reimbursed to the contractor
26by the Government. In contrast, the Incentive Price Revision clause,
which is included in fixed-price incentive contracts, provides that the to-
tal final price is not "subject to revision, notwithstanding any changes in
the cost of performing the contract," unless the parties have specifically
21agreed in their contract that adjustments or credits are permitted.
In addition to the FAR cost principles, Cost Accounting Standards
(CAS) 412 and 413 govern pension costs - even under contracts not
otherwise subject to the Cost Accounting Standards. More particularly,
in order to be allowable for government contracting purposes, the costs
of a defined benefit pension plan must, among other things, be measured,
allocated, and assigned to cost accounting periods in compliance with
CAS 412 and 413.28 CAS 412 provides "guidance for determining and
measuring the components of pension cost ... [and] establishes the basis
on which pension costs shall be assigned to cost accounting periods., 29 It
requires that pension cost for defined benefit pension plans "be deter-
mined by use of an immediate-gain actuarial cost method," and that, with
limited exceptions, the pension cost be assignable only in the current cost
accounting period.0 CAS 413 provides "guidance for adjusting pension
cost by measuring actuarial gains and losses and assigning such gains and
losses to cost accounting periods . . . [and] the bases on which pension
cost shall be allocated to segments of an organization."'" It requires that
the actuarial gains and losses "be calculated annually" and "be assigned
to the cost accounting period for which the actuarial valuation is made
25. 48 C.F.R. § 52.216-7(h)(2) (1998).
26. See id. § 52.216-7(h)(2)(i) (1998); see also 32 C.F.R. § 7-203.4(L) (1982).
27. 48 C.F.R. §§ 52.216-16(e), 52.216-17(g) (1998).
28. See id. § 31.205-60)(2).
29. Id. § 9904.412-20 (defining the purpose of the CAS for composition and meas-
urement of pension costs).
30. Id. §§ 9904.412-40(b), (c) (governing the measurement and assignment of pension
costs).
31. Id. § 9904.413-20 (stating the purpose of adjustment and allocation of pension
costs).
1999] 1143
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and [to] subsequent periods." 2
As originally promulgated, CAS 413-50(c)(12) included a so-called
"segment closing" provision that specified in part:
If a segment is closed, the contractor shall determine the differ-
ence between the actuarial liability for the segment and the
market value of the assets allocated to the segment, irrespective
of whether or not the pension plan is terminated .... The dif-
ference between the market value of the assets and the actuarial
liability for the segment represents an adjustment of previously-
determined pension costs.
3
The term "segment" is defined as "one of two or more divisions, prod-
uct departments, plants, or other subdivisions of an organization report-
ing directly to a home office, usually identified with responsibility for
profit and/or producing a product or service. 3 4 Although the original
Standard defines the term "segment," it does not specify the circum-
stances under which a segment is to be considered "closed., 3' Nor does
the original Standard more explicitly define the phrase "adjustment of
previously-determined pension costs." Nevertheless, both the plain lan-
guage of the original Standard and its regulatory history clarify that an
"adjustment of previously-determined costs" is intended to be an ac-
counting adjustment (i.e., an adjustment reflected on the contractor's
books of account) of the pension costs previously allocated. Whether the
accounting adjustment affects the cost allowance or price of any particu-
lar contract depends upon the procurement regulations rather than the
CAS.
32. Id. § 9904.413-40.
33. 4 C.F.R. § 413.50(c)(12) (1978).
34. 48 C.F.R. § 9904.413-30(a)(19) (1998).
35. Nevertheless, the sole segment closing illustration in the original Standard sup-
ports a literal reading of the term "closed" to mean the cessation of operations. That illus-
tration, originally appearing at CAS 413-60(c)(8), involves a segment performing a single
government contract, which the Government declines to renew at the end of the contract
term. See 48 C.FR. § 9904.413-60(c)(8) (1992). As a result, the facility is closed: "Al-
though some employees are hired by the successor contractor, as far as Contractor K is
concerned, the facility is closed." Id. Notably, the segment in the illustration has not been
sold or transferred to the successor contractor, and there is no indication that its opera-
tions have continued. See id. Rather, it appears from the illustration that the segment has
been physically closed, and that its operations have ceased. See id. By contrast, the illus-
tration initially found at CAS 413.609(c)(5), which posits a scenario in which a segment
has been acquired by another contractor, neither characterizes the event as a segment
closing nor mentions the segment closing provision of CAS 413.50(c)(12). See id. § 9904.413-
60(c)(5). Instead, it explains that the acquiring contractor must separately account for the
acquired segment's pension assets and liabilities, pursuant to CAS 413.50(c)(5) and (7),
and use this segment accounting as the "basis for calculating the annual pension cost ap-
plicable to [the acquired segment]." Id.
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Similar to the current Cost Accounting Standards Board (CAS Board),
the authority of the Board that originally promulgated CAS 413 was lim-
ited to issues of allocability and not allowability.36 In establishing the
original CAS Board, Congress noted that:
The essential problem in cost accounting is to develop methods
for allocating expenses to a particular contract. Direct expenses
associated with the contract are fairly easy to determine; how-
ever, there are a variety of methods for allocating indirect or
overhead expenses. Since overhead often represents more than
half the cost of a contract, the particular cost accounting
method used to allocate overhead char es has a crucial bearing
on determining the cost of the contract.
Accordingly, Congress directed the CAS Board to "promulgate cost-
accounting standards designed to achieve uniformity and consistency in
the cost-accounting principles followed by defense contractors and sub-
contractors under Federal contracts." '38 Faithful to its charge, the original
Board recognized the distinction between allocability and allowability,
observing in its 1977 Restatement of Objectives, Policies and Concepts
that:
The CASB does not determine categories or individual items of
cost that are allowable. Allowability is a procurement concept
affecting contract price and in most cases is established in
regulatory or contractual provisions. An agency's policies on
allowability of costs may be derived from law and are generally
embodied in its procurement regulations ....
Allocability is an accounting concept involving the ascertain-
ment of contract cost; it results from a relationship between a
cost and a cost objective such that the cost objective appropri-
ately bears all or a portion of the cost. For a particular cost
objective to have allocated to it all or part of a cost there should
exist a beneficial or causal relationship between the cost objec-
tive and the CoSt.
39
Consistently, in promulgating CAS 413, the CAS Board deferred to
the procurement regulations for the determination of how, if at all, the
36. See S. REP. No. 100-424, at 17 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5687, 5703.
37. S. REP. No. 91-890, at 3 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3768, 3770.
38. Defense Production Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-379, 84 Stat. 796,
797 (1970). The original CAS Board ceased to exist on September 30, 1980, when Con-
gress failed to appropriate funds for it.
39. Cost Accounting Standards Board Restatement of Objectives, Policies and Con-
cepts, 77 Fed. Reg. 14291 (May 18, 1977), reprinted in CCH Cost Accounting Standards
Guide 2915.
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accounting adjustment required by CAS 413.50(c)(12) should be made.
The CAS Board staff's May 14, 1976 Background Paper, for example,
contains an early draft of the segment closing provision that provides:
If all, or substantially all, of a segment is closed, and a signifi-
cant number of employees are thereby separated from the plan,
the contractor shall compute a net gain or loss from the plan
applicable to that segment, irrespective of the actuarial cost
method used .... The net gain (or loss) shall be used as a basis
for determining any appropriate adjustments consistent with
existing Government contract regulations.40
Similarly, the CAS Board staff's January 3, 1977 Staff Paper observes
that:
The proposed Standard provides that the net pension plan gain
or loss resulting from the closing of the business unit be consid-
ered in arriving at any overall contract settlement price, consis-
tent with existing Government contract regulations. The pro-
posed Standard does not set forth the extent, if any, to which
such net gains or losses shall be considered in any settlement41
As initially proposed, the CAS 413 segment closing provision (then
numbered 413.50(c)(13)) would have provided that:
The requirements of paragraphs (c)(1) and (2) of this section
are appropriate only for segments whose productive operations
are continuing. However, if a segment is closed and a signifi-
cant number of employees are thereby terminated from the
plan, the contractor shall compute a net gain or loss from the
plan applicable to that segment, irrespective of whether or not
the pension plan is terminated .... The net gain or loss from
the plan for the segment shall be used as a basis for negotiating
any appropriate adjustments.
42
The final rule, published on July 20, 1977, omits the requirement for
negotiating an adjustment, and provides simply that "[tihe difference be-
tween the market value of the assets and the actuarial liability for the
segment represents an adjustment of previously-determined pension
costs. ' 43 Accordingly, the rule leaves entirely to the procurement regula-
tions how or whether the "adjustment" affects the cost allowance or price
40. COST ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., COST ACCOUNTING STANDARD
ADJUSTMENT AND ALLOCATION OF PENSION COST, at 9-10 (1976) (emphasis added).
41. COST ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., COST ACCOUNTING STANDARD
ADJUSTMENT AND ALLOCATION OF PENSION COST, at 32 (1977).
42. Adjustment and Allocation of Pension Cost, 42 Fed. Reg. 6594, 6596 (1977) (em-
phasis added).
43. Id. at 37,191, 37,198.
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of any contract.
III. CHRONOLOGY OF REGULATORY CHANGES
In February 1987, the Civilian Agency Acquisition Council and the
Defense Acquisition Regulatory Council (collectively "FAR Council")
proposed to amend the FAR to establish an express government right to
share in the reversion of pension funds to a contractor following the ter-
mination of an overfunded defined benefit pension plan." Comments
accompanying the proposal asserted that:
Charges for pension costs have been accepted on Government
contracts on the basis that funding was irrevocable and there-
fore that the Government would participate in all gains and
losses incurred by pension plans. In recent years, many pension
plans have been terminated and excess pension plan assets have
reverted to and have been used by the sponsoring company for
other purposes. Such proceeds represent an adjustment of prior
period's [sic] pension costs.
45
Accordingly, the drafters proposed adding a new paragraph, (j)(4), to
the "Compensation for personal services" cost principle at FAR 31.205-6
that would establish a "method for computing the Government's equita-
ble share of any such adjustments of prior periods' pension costs. 4 6 As
initially proposed, the "Government's share" would have been deter-
mined by multiplying the difference between the market value of the
plan assets and the termination value of the plan liabilities by "the ratio
of pension expense absorbed by all Government contracts and subcon-
tracts (including Foreign Military Sales) to total pension costs incurred
during the 10-year period preceding the date of plan termination, or the
period from the inception date of the plan being terminated, whichever is
shorter., 47  A proposed new contract clause, Termination of Defined
Benefit Pension Plans, was to "trigger" this look-back provision, allowing
the Government to share in the proceeds "on a basis proportionate to
44. See FAR Termination of Defined Benefit Pension Plans, 52 Fed. Reg. 4084, 4084-
85 (1987).
45. Id. at 4084.
46. Solicitation Provisions and Contract Clauses, 52 Fed. Reg. 4084, 4085 (1987).
47. Id. at 4086 (proposed FAR 31.205-6(j)(4)(i)-(ii)). Mathematically, the equation
for computing the Government share under the proposed rule is as follows:
(aggregate amount of pension costs allocated to all government contracts and subcon-
tracts during the ten years preceding the date of plan termination [or the period from the
inception date of the plan, whichever is shorter]) / (divided by) (total pension costs as-
signed during the same period)) x (times) (pension surplus) = (equals) (government share).
See id.
1999] 1147
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the amount of pension costs absorbed by all Government contracts,
competitive and noncompetitive, fixed price and cost reimbursement
types, and small purchases and major purchases."48
Not surprisingly, the 1987 proposal met fierce industry opposition,' 
49
largely because of the rule's proposed retroactive effect. The final rule,
published August 21, 1989 (and effective September 20, 1989), deleted
the 10-year look-back provision and asserted a more limited (i.e., pro-
spective) government right to share in the surplus pension assets. ° As
finally promulgated, the new section 31.205-60)(4) provides that:
When excess or surplus assets revert to the contractor as a re-
sult of termination of a defined benefit pension plan, or such as-
sets are constructively received by it for any reason, the contrac-
tor shall make a refund or give a credit to the Government for
its equitable share. The Government's equitable share shall re-
flect the Government's participation in pension costs through
those contracts for which certified (see 15.804) cost or pricing
data were submitted or which are subject to subpart 31.2.
At the same time, the FAR Credits provision was amended to add a
cross-reference to the new section 31.205-6(j)(4). The Termination of
Defined Benefit Pension Plans clause was similarly scaled back from the
initial proposal, and as finally published, provides that:
The Contractor shall promptly notify the Contracting Officer in
writing when it determines that it will terminate a defined bene-
fit pension plan or otherwise recapture such pension fund as-
sets. If pension fund assets revert to the Contractor or are con-
structively received by it under a termination or otherwise, the
Contractor shall make a refund or give a credit to the Govern-
ment for its equitable share as required by FAR 31.205-6(j)(4).
The Contractor shall include the substance of this clause in all
subcontracts under this contract which meet the applicability
requirement of FAR 15.804(e).
The drafters' comments explain, without elaboration, that the changes
from the initial proposal were made "[a]s a result of public comments re-
48. Id. at 4085 (proposed FAR 52.215-27).
49. See, e.g., Contractors Oppose Recapture Proposal, PENSION & INVESTMENT AGE,
May 18, 1987, at 6.
50. See 54 Fed. Reg. 34,755, 34,755 (1989).
51. Id.
52. 48 C.F.R. § 52.215-27 (1989). The provision was subsequently renumbered in De-
cember 1998 and renamed FAR 52.215-15, Pension Adjustments and Asset Reversions. See
Solicitation Provisions and Contract Clauses, 63 Fed. Reg. 58,598 (1998).
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ceived."53
Effective August 22, 1991, FAR 31.205-6 was further amended to add a
new subparagraph (j)(3)(v), providing that, in absence of an advance
agreement, the "withdrawal of assets from a pension fund and transfer to
another employee benefit plan fund" would be deemed a constructive
withdrawal and receipt of funds under FAR 31.205-6(j)(4). 4 The new
rule required that the advance agreement "(A) State the amount of the
Government's equitable share in the gross amount withdrawn; and (B)
Provide that the Government receive a credit equal to the amount of the
Government's equitable share of the gross withdrawal."55 It also man-
dated that transfers made, without first entering into an agreement, were
to be treated as a partial termination of the defined benefit pension plan,
requiring a cash refund or credit to the Government.56 According to the
drafters' comments, this change was necessary to ensure "continuity of
the Government's equitable share" in the event a contractor with an
overfunded pension plan uses excess pension funds to pay for post-
retirement medical benefits (PRB).7 Around the same time, a new
clause, Reversion or Adjustment of Plans for Postretirement Benefits
Other than Pensions, was added to the FAR to address reversions of as-
sets from PRB plans." Like the Termination of Defined Benefit Pension
Plans clause, the new clause required the contractor to "make a refund
or give a credit to the Government for its equitable share" in any PRB
fund assets that revert to or are constructively received by the contrac-
tor.59
With the promulgation of the revised CAS 413 in 1995, the Govern-
ment began to assert a right to an "equitable share" in surplus pension
funds after a "segment closing," despite the fact that the contractor
53. 54 Fed. Reg. at 34,750 (1989).
54. 56 Fed. Reg. 41,736, 41,739 (1991).
55. Id. at 41,739.
56. See id.
57. See id. at 41,729. PRB costs include the costs of all postretirement "benefits,
other than cash benefits and life insurance benefits paid by pension plans, provided to em-
ployees, their beneficiaries, and covered dependents during the period following the em-
ployees' retirement." 48 C.F.R. § 31.205-6(o) (1998). Although PRBs may include such
benefits as life insurance provided outside of a pension plan, tuition assistance, day care,
legal services, and housing subsidies, the single largest PRB cost is due to post-retirement
health care. See id.
58. See 56 Fed. Reg. 29,124, 29,138 (1991).
59. See 48 C.F.R. § 52.215-39 (1991) (subsequently renumbered FAR 52.215-18, Re-
version or Adjustment of Plans for Postretirement Benefits (PRB) Other Than Pensions,
48 C.F.R. § 52.215-18 (1998)).
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would not gain access to the funds, either actually or constructively. 60 On
March 30, 1995, the CAS Board amended CAS 412 and 413 to "address[]
certain problems that have emerged since the original promulgation (in
the 1970's) of the pension Standards," including, in particular, "problems
associated with overfunded pension plans., 61 Of particular interest here
are the changes that were made to CAS 413-50(c)(12) regarding the
Government's right to an adjustment as the result of a segment closing.
The revision expands the new definition of "segment closing" to include
(1) selling or transferring ownership of a segment, (2) discontinuing seg-
ment operations, or (3) discontinuing or no longer actively seeking gov-
62ernment business under CAS-covered contracts. It also expands cover-
age of section 413-50(c)(12) to include not only segment closings, but
pension plan terminations and curtailments of benefits. Additionally,
and perhaps most significantly, the revision adds an aggressive new
methodology for determining the "adjustment" due the Government
upon the closing of a segment. It requires that, with limited exceptions,
the Government's full share-which is to be based on the percentage of
CAS-covered contracts-must be credited to the Government in the ac-
counting period of the segment closing event.
61
More recently, FAR 31.205-60)(4) was revised, effective December 29,
1998, to add a complementary "pension adjustment" provision for non-
CAS-covered contracts. 64 As amended, FAR 31.205-6(j)(4)(i) provides
that for non-CAS-covered contracts and subcontracts, the pension ad-
justment amount is the amount computed in accordance with CAS
413.50(c)(12)(vi), except that the Government's share is based on the
percentage of non-CAS-covered contracts and subcontracts that are
subject to the FAR cost principles or for which cost or pricing data were
submitted.6' The revision also provides, at new subparagraph (j)(4)(ii),
that for situations other than segment closings, pension plan termina-
tions, or curtailment of benefits, "where assets revert to the contractor,
or such assets are constructively received by it for any reason, the con-
tractor shall, at the Government's option, make a refund or give a credit
to the Government for its equitable share of the gross amount with-
60. Cf. 48 C.F.R. § 9904.413-50(c)(12).
61. Cost Accounting Standards for Composition, Measurement, Adjustment, and
Allocation of Pension Costs, 60 Fed. Reg. 16,534, 16,534 (1995).
62. See id. at 16,550.
63. See id. at 16,552.
64. See 63 Fed. Reg. 58,595, 58,597-98 (1998).
65. See id. at 58,598.
1150 [Vol. 48:1139
Government Claims to Surplus Pension Assets
drawn." 66 Hence, unlike the adjustment required by the revised CAS
413.50(c)(12) and FAR 31.205-6(j)(4)(i), the adjustment required by
FAR 31.205-6(j)(4)(ii) does not permit an offset for excise taxes imposed
on the withdrawal of pension plan assets.
IV. GOVERNMENT CLAIMS UNDER CAS 413
A. Computing the "Government's share" Under Revised CAS 413
A wide variety of events can trigger a government claim to surplus
pension assets under the revised CAS 413, including (1) contractor sale
or other transfer of ownership of a segment,67 (2) discontinuance of the
operations of a segment, (3) discontinuance of the performance or active
seeking of CAS-covered government contracts, (4) termination of a pen-
sion plan, and (5) curtailment of pension benefits.68 On the other hand,
non-enumerated events, such as pension plan mergers or segment merg-
ers, that do not involve or result in one of the enumerated events, are not
segment closing events and do not give rise to a government claim of en-
titlement. Moreover, the Standard provides that an adjustment is not
necessary when the contractor sells or otherwise transfers ownership of a
segment and transfers all of the pension plan assets and liabilities alloc-
69able to the segment to the successor segment.
It is unclear whether internal reorganizations are segment closing
events for purposes of CAS 413.50(c)(12). The CAS Board's comments
accompanying the final rule note that "[c]oncerns were raised that an in-
ternal reorganization would require a current period adjustment for a
segment closing even though neither the segment's nor the contractor's
relationship to the Government had changed."7 ° The CAS Board re-
sponded that:
The definition [of a segment closing] has been revised to de-
lineate three conditions requiring a current period adjustment.
The first condition occurs when there is a change in ownership
66. Id. (emphasis added).
67. See Lockheed Martin Tactical Defense Sys., Akron, 98-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 30,079,
at 148,847 (1998). In a decision that could potentially limit the scope of the first segment
closing event, i.e., the sale or other transfer of ownership of a segment, the Armed Services
Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) has recently held that the merger by stock sale of a
segment's parent corporation does not change the ownership of the segment. See id. at
148,849-50 (1998).
68. See 48 C.F.R. §§ 9904.413-30(a)(20), 9904.413-50(c)(12) (1998).
69. See id. § 9904.413-50(c)(12)(v).
70. Cost Accounting Standards for Composition, Measurement, Adjustment, and
Allocation of Pension Costs, 60 Fed. Reg. 16,534, 16,539 (1995).
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of the segment, not just a simple reorganization within the con-
tractor's internal structure. The second event is the one ad-
dressed in the NPRM; that is, when the contractual relationship
ends because the segment operationally ceases to exist. The
third case addresses the end of the contractual relationship with
the Government, whether the segment continues in operation
or not.7'
Two points are worth noting. First, the CAS Board's assurance that
"just a simple reorganization" is not a segment closing addresses only
one of the segment closing events. Second, and perhaps more trouble-
some, the two illustrations involving internal reorganizations both con-
clude that a segment closing has occurred. The illustration at CAS 413-
60(c)(13) involves a contractor who, as part of a corporate reorganiza-
tion, closes the production facility for one of its segments and transfers
all of the segment's contracts and employees to its two remaining gov-
ernment segments. The illustration concludes that a segment closing
has occurred because the segment has discontinued operations.73 Never-
theless, it goes on to note that "because all pension assets and liabilities
have been transferred to other segments or to successors in interest of
the contracts of [the closed segment], an immediate period adjustment is
not required pursuant to 9904.413-50(c)(12)(v). 74  The illustration at
CAS 413-60(c)(14) involves a contractor who decides to exit the govern-
ment market, reducing the workforce of its government segment and
converting its operations to commercial work.7' Again, the illustration
concludes that a segment closing has occurred. Moreover, it asserts that
a segment closing adjustment is required.76
Upon the occurrence of any of the enumerated segment closing events,
the contractor is required to perform a final segment accounting by com-
puting, as of the date of the event, "the difference between the actuarial
accrued liability for the segment and the market value of the assets allo-
cated to the segment., 77 In determining the actuarial accrued liability for
the segment, the contractor is required to use the accrued benefit cost
method78 and actuarial assumptions that are "consistent with the current
71. Id.
72. See 48 C.F.R. § 9904.413-60(c)(13) (1998).
73. See id.
74. Id.
75. See id. § 9904.413-60(c)(14).
76. See id.
77. Id. § 9904.413-50(c)(12).
78. See 48 C.F.R. §§ 9904.411-63, 9904.412-20, 9904.412-30(a)(1) (1998). The "ac-
crued benefit cost method" measures the actuarial liability based on the employees' serv-
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and prior long term assumptions used in the measurement of pension
costs" on the contractor's government contracts.79 Nevertheless, if the
contractor terminates its pension plan, the actuarial accrued liability is
measured by the amount paid to settle its benefit obligations, e.g., the
amount paid to purchase annuities for its employees or paid to the Pen-
sion Benefit Guarantee Corporation.80 Improvements to a pension plan
adopted within sixty months prior to the segment closing, except those
mandated by law or collective bargaining agreement, are recognized only
on a pro-rata phase-in basis." For example, the computation of actuarial
accrued liabilities would include only fifty percent (i.e., 30/60) of the
added cost of a benefit implemented thirty months before the segment
closing. "[T]he difference between the actuarial accrued liability for the
segment and the market value of the assets allocated to the segment" is
called the "adjustment amount." 82 The adjustment amount is to be re-
duced by any excise tax imposed on the contractor for withdrawing the
pension assets.83
The "Government's share" under the revised CAS 413 is computed by
multiplying the net adjustment amount by a fraction: the numerator is
"the sum of the pension plan costs allocated to all [CAS-covered] con-
tracts and subcontracts (including Foreign Military Sales) .. .during a
period of years representative of the Government's participation in the
pension plan" (a term that is not defined), and the denominator is the
total pension costs assigned during the same "representative" period of
years.85 In other words, the Government's purported "equitable share" is
based upon the segment's percentage of CAS-covered prime contracts
and subcontracts during a period of years in which the Government was
ice to date, and does not include any salary projection for future service. See id. By con-
trast, a "projected benefit cost method" includes prospective benefits. See 48 C.F.R.
§ 9904.412-30(a)(24). Accordingly, for ongoing pension plans (i.e., those not terminated in
the segment closing), the use of the accrued benefit cost method effectively understates
the plan's liabilities and artificially inflates the amount of any surplus.
79. See 48 C.F.R. § 9904.413-50(c)(12)(i) (1998).
80. See id.
81. See id. § 9904.413-50(c)(12)(iv).
82. Id. § 9904.413-50(c)(12).
83. See id. § 9904.413-50(c)(12)(vi).
84. Id., but cf. infra note 86 and accompanying text (noting that the period of years
should include the whole life of the plan).
85. See 48 C.F.R. § 9904.413-50(c)(12)(vi) (1998). Mathematically, the equation for
computing the Government's share is as follows:
(aggregate amount of pension costs allocated to all CAS-covered contracts and subcon-
tracts during a representative period of years) / (divided by) (total pension costs assigned
during the same representative period of years) x (times) (surplus - (minus) excise taxes)
= (equals) (government share). See id.
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"participating" in the pension plan, without regard to whether those con-
tracts were firm-fixed-price or flexibly priced, whether the contracts are
now open or closed, or whether the surplus was built up over many years
81before the contractor ever held a CAS-covered contract. Significantly,
the adjustment, which could be made on one or several CAS-covered
contracts, would not be limited to the amounts allocated to the Govern-
ment. Rather, the Government's claim would include the unrealized ap-
preciation (i.e., investment growth to date) of such costs. In other words,
the Government would seek its share of the pension plan's investment
earnings, notwithstanding the fact that all of the pension assets would
remain in the pension trust. Moreover, the full amount of the Govern-
ment's supposed share is due "as a credit or charge during the cost ac-
counting period in which the event occurred and contract prices/costs will
be adjusted accordingly." ' The parties may, however, decide upon an
amortization schedule, with interest, if the contractor continues to per-
form government contracts. 8
B. The Revised CAS 413 Changes, Not Clarifies, the Original Standard
By its terms, the revised Standard becomes applicable upon receipt of
a CAS-covered contract or subcontract in the contractor's first fiscal year
after March 30, 1995.89 Nonetheless, and in spite of the obvious signifi-
cance of the March 1995 revisions, paragraph 9904.413-64(c) of the re-
vised Standard asserts that: "[T]his Standard ... clarifies, but is not in-
tended to create, rights of the contracting parties, and specifies
techniques for determining adjustments pursuant to 9904.413-50(c)(12).
These rights and techniques should be used to resolve outstanding issues
that will affect pension costs of contracts subject to this Standard." 9 One
of the principal drafters of the CAS 413 revisions, Health Care Financing
Administration employee Eric H. Shipley, testified in a deposition that
he had carefully chosen the wording of this paragraph:
I have been coached enough by enough lawyers that the word
choice - one of the pivotal words in this paragraph is - that I
used "should" instead of the mandatory "shall." The intent -
86. See id. More equitably, the period of years pinpointed as the Government's par-
ticipation in the pension plan should include the entire life of the plan because the plan
assets and liabilities necessarily accumulate over many years, and not just during the pe-
riod in which the contractor's contributions happen to be allocated to its CAS-covered
government contracts.
87. Id. § 9904.413-50(c)(12)(vii).
88. See id.
89. See 48 C.F.R. § 9904.413-63(a), (b) (1998).
90. Id. § 9904.413-64(c).
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and what - the reason the board accepted and approved this
paragraph was they agreed with the notion that the new CAS
certainly characterized how they saw the CAS should have been
operating and took care of a lot of things by specificity, and
they wanted to make sure that it was strongly regarded as
authoritative guidance.9'
The case in which this testimony was provided, Gould, Inc.,"' involved
a government claim for surplus pension assets arising out of the contrac-
tor's sale of five business units during 1987 and 1988. The case was
pending before the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals
(ASBCA) when the revised CAS 413 was published.93 The Government
urged the ASBCA to apply the revised provisions of CAS 413, arguing
that the revision was "only a clarification rather than a substantive
change.,94 Not surprisingly, the ASBCA rejected the Government's ar-
gument, holding that:
We believe that we should hearken to the language and admin-
istrative history of the original standard as in effect at the rele-
vant time. If the references to "prices" in the standard as
amended have the effect urged by the Government, a question
which we do not decide, it is quite clear that they go beyond
anything in [CAS 413.50](c)(12) as applicable to this appeal.9
The ASBCA also held that CAS 413, as originally promulgated, did
not entitle the Government to recover any share of surplus pension as-
sets allocable to firm-fixed-price contracts, but required a current period
adjustment of pension costs allocable to flexibly priced contracts. 96 Ex-
pressly left unresolved in Gould is the validity and reach of the new CAS
413.
C. Potential Legal Challenges to Government Claims Under the Revised
CAS 413
The Government faces significant, and perhaps insurmountable hur-
dles in seeking to enforce the terms of the revised CAS 413, because the
Standard is flawed both procedurally and substantively. The revised
91. Transcript of the Deposition of Eric H. Shipley at 119, Gould, Inc., 97-2 B.C.A.
(CCH) 29,254 (1997), affd, 98-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 29,469 (1997) (No. 46759).
92. Gould, Inc., 97-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 29,254, at 145,535 (1997), aff'd, 98-1 B.C.A.
(CCH) 29,469 (1997).
93. See id.
94. Government's Post-Trial Brief at 27, Gould, Inc., 97-2 B.C.A. (CCH) $ 29,254, at
145,547.
95. Gould, Inc., 97-2 B.C.A at 145,547.
96. See id.
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Standard is procedurally defective because in promulgating the revision
the CAS Board failed to comply with the rulemaking requirements of the
Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) Act. The revision is also
substantively flawed because it exceeds the CAS Board's statutory
authority. Finally, even if the revised CAS 413 were deemed applicable
and enforceable, the contractor would nonetheless be entitled to an off-
setting equitable adjustment in the amount of the Government's de-
mand.
1. The CAS Board Failed to Follow the Required Rulemaking
Procedures
As an independent board within OFPP, the CAS Board is subject to
the rulemaking provisions of the OFPP Act.9' Absent urgent and com-
pelling circumstances, Section 22 of the OFPP Act prohibits any pro-
curement regulation having either "a significant effect beyond the inter-
nal operating procedures of the agency" or "a significant cost or
administrative impact on contractors" from taking effect until sixty days
after the regulation is published for public comment.98 Additionally, Sec-
tion 26(g) requires completion of a careful four-step rulemaking process
before the CAS Board may issue any new or revised Standard.99 Under
the four-step process, the Board first must study the issue in consultation
with the Comptroller General, professional accounting organizations,
contractors, and other interested parties, and publish the results of this
study in the Federal Register.'0° Second, the Board must "publish an ad-
vanced notice of proposed rulemaking [(ANPRM)] in the Federal Regis-
ter," and allow sixty days for public comment0 1 Third, after considera-
tion of the comments received, the Board must publish a notice of
proposed rulemaking (NPRM), and allow at least sixty additional days
for public comment.'°2 Fourth, after again considering the comments re-
ceived, the Board may publish a final rule.' °3 Although the Board may
properly modify a proposed rule in response to public comments without
the necessity of further comment, it cannot introduce significant, substan-
tive changes without providing the requisite notice and public com-
97. See 41 U.S.C. § 422 (1994).
98. See id. § 418b(a).
99. See id. § 422(g).
100. See id. § 422(g)(1)(A), (B).
101. Id. § 422(g)(1)(C).
102. See id. § 422(g)(1)(D).
103. See id. at § 422(g)(2).
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ment.'4
The CAS Board has violated these procedural requirements by making
significant changes to CAS 413 after the NPRM and therefore without
benefit of public comment. Indeed, the CAS Board itself has conceded
as much in its comments accompanying publication of the final rule, ex-
plaining that:
The public comments received in response to the NPRM raised
some new issues. In the final rule, the Board addresses these is-
sues focusing on three areas in particular. These deal with the
restriction of accrual accounting by an outside limit, incomplete
and unclear coverage for segment closings and pension plan ter-
minations, and the lack of accounting for differences between
accrued and funded pension costs."'
The ANPRM deals principally with CAS 412,1° and the NPRM, al-
though it discusses CAS 413, makes only modest changes to the original
CAS 413.'07 The Board added all of the most controversial aspects of the
new segment closing provision, § 9904.413-50(c)(12)(i) through (vii), af-
ter publishing the NPRM, and thus promulgated them without the requi-
site public notice and comment. °8 Most significantly, the final rule, un-
like the NPRM, requires a current period adjustment regardless of
whether pension assets have actually reverted to the contractor, and in-
cludes in the calculation of that adjustment closed and FFP contracts.109
By contrast, the NPRM makes comparatively minor changes to the origi-
nal CAS 413.50(c)(12): other than distinguishing between qualified and
nonqualified plans, the NPRM repeats, verbatim and without elabora-
tion, the original CAS 413.50(c)(12) statement that "the difference be-
tween the market value of the assets and the actuarial liability for the
segment represents an adjustment of previously-determined pension
costs."'' 0 Additionally, the final rule revises the definition of segment
104. See infra notes 122, 125 and accompanying text (discussing cases that have ad-
dressed what qualifies as significant substantive changes).
105. Cost Accounting Standards for Composition, Measurement, Adjustment, and
Allocation of Pension Costs, 60 Fed. Reg. 16,534, 16,535 (1995) (to be codified at 48
C.F.R. pts. 9903, 9904) (emphasis added).
106. See Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 58 Fed. Reg. 6103, 6103-04 (1993).
107. See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 58 Fed. Reg. at 58,999-59,000.
108. See supra note 105 and accompanying text (explaining that the final rule reflects
changes made, in response to NPRM comments, without such changes first being subject
to public scrutiny).
109. See Cost Accounting Standards for Composition, Measurement, Adjustment, and
Allocation of Pension Costs, 60 Fed. Reg. at 16,539.
110. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 58 Fed. Reg. at 59,005-06. Compare id., with 48
C.F.R. § 9904.413-50(c)(12) (1994).
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closing "to delineate three conditions requiring a current period adjust-
ment";.. the NPRM only addresses one of these conditions, namely, sale
or other transfer of ownership."2 The final rule also adds a sixty-month
phase-in for benefit improvements that is not mentioned in the NPRM."3
Finally, whereas the ANPRM observes that "pension costs estimated for
fixed price contracts are never adjusted regardless of subsequent actuar-
ial events,"' 4 the final rule asserts a right to adjust the price of fixed-price
contracts."' These changes are not only significant, but they were made
without any notice, in either the ANPRM or the NPRM."6
The functions the CAS Board exercises are exempt from review under
the Administrative Procedures Act,"7 but are reviewable under the
111. Cost Accounting Standards for Composition, Measurement, Adjustment, and
Allocation of Pension Costs, 60 Fed. Reg. at 16,539.
112. Compare id. at 16,550 (defining segment closing as when "a segment has (i) been
sold or ownership has been otherwise transferred, (ii) discontinued operations, or (iii) dis-
continued doing or actively seeking Government business under contracts subject to this
Standard"), with Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 58 Fed. Reg. at 59,005 (defining seg-
ment closing as when "a segment has been sold, abandoned, spun off, or otherwise dis-
posed of.").
113. Compare Cost Accounting Standards for Composition, Measurement, Adjust-
ment, and Allocation of Pension Costs, 60 Fed. Reg. at 16,552
(Pension plan improvements adopted within 60 months of the date of the [seg-
ment closing] event which increase the actuarial accrued liability shall be recog-
nized on a prorata basis using the number of months the date of adoption pre-
ceded the event date. Plan improvements mandated by law or collective
bargaining agreement are not subject to this phase-in.),
with Cost Accounting Standards for Composition, Measurement, Adjustment, and Alloca-
tion of Pension Costs, 58 Fed. Reg. at 59,005-06 (NPRM contains no provision comparable
to § 9904.412-50(c)(12)(iv)).
114. COST ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET,
COST ACCOUNTING STANDARDS FOR COMPOSITION, MEASUREMENT, ADJUSTMENT,
AND ALLOCATION OF PENSION COSTS, at 7 (1993).
115. See Cost Accounting Standards for Composition, Measurement, Adjustment, and
Allocation of Pension Costs, 60 Fed. Reg. at 16,540.
116. See supra note 105 and accompanying text (illustrating that the final rule reflects
changes made without public notice). Ironically, it was only after making significant
changes in the final rule that the CAS Board added language to § 9904.413-64(c) to claim
that the revised Standard merely "clarifies" the existing rule. See Cost Accounting Stan-
dards for Composition, Measurement, Adjustment, and Allocation of Pension Costs, 60
Fed. Reg. at 16,557.
117. See 41 U.S.C. § 422(g)(3). The Administrative Procedures Act is found at Title 5,
Chapter 5 of the U.S.C. Specifically, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551, 553-59 are not applicable to CAS
Board actions. See id.
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Contract Disputes Act"8 and the Tucker Act.n 9 Although there are no
reported decisions that challenge the Standards issued by the current
CAS Board based on procedural deficiencies, several contractors have
challenged Standards promulgated by the previous CAS Board on this
basis."2 Although applicable law and regulation did not require the pre-
vious CAS Board to comply with precisely the same procedural require-
ments as the current CAS Board, 2' these challenges are nevertheless in-
structive.
122For example, in Lockheed Corp., the ASBCA found unenforceable
the CAS Board Interpretation No. 1 to CAS 403 because the CAS Board
"failed to follow the statutory requirements for issuance of a standard.',
2 3
The ASBCA rejected the Government's argument that the interpreta-
tion effected only a "minor" or "technical" change, which would not re-
quire notice and comment; it reasoned that a new definition of "factors"
for CAS 403 was not a "trivial" matter.'24 On the other hand, in Boeing
Co. v. United States,2 the Court of Claims, now called the United States
Court of Federal Claims, concluded that CAS 403 was properly promul-
gated, because the final rule was, with the exception of a minor change to
one of the illustrations, substantially the same as the proposed rule. 6
Hence, where the final rule contains significant, substantive changes that
were not made available for public comment, as was the case with CAS
413.50(c)(12), the new or modified Standard should be held invalid and
118. See 41 U.S.C. § 422(h)(2) (1994). The Contract Disputes Act is found at Title 41,
Chapter 9 of the U.S.C.. See 41 U.S.C. §§ 601-13 (1994). See also Lockheed Corp. &
Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 86-1 B.C.A (CCH) J1 18,614, at 93,540-42 (1985) (con-
cluding that ASBCA has jurisdiction under the Contract Disputes Act "to determine
whether a promulgation constitutes a cost accounting standard with which a contractor
must comply"), affd United States v. Lockheed Corp., 817 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
119. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a) (1994).
120. See infra notes 122-26 and accompanying text. Congress created the original CAS
Board in 1970 and gave it exclusive statutory authority to develop and promulgate uni-
form cost accounting standards, rules, and regulations. See Defense Production Act,
Amendments, Pub. L. No. 91-379, § 103, 84 Stat. 796, 797-98 (1970) (repealed 1988). The
Board ceased to exist in 1980 when Congress failed to appropriate funding, but the stan-
dards, rules, and regulations it had promulgated remained in effect as of 1988. See S. REP.
No. 100-424, at 15 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5687, 5701. The Office of Fed-
eral Procurement Policy Act Amendments of 1988 reestablished the CAS Board. See Pub.
L. No. 100-679, § 26,102 Stat. 4055, 4059 (1988).
121. Compare § 103, 84 Stat. at 798-99, with § 26, 102 Stat. at 4061.
122. 86-1 B.C.A. (CCH) at 93,513.
123. Id. at 93,542.
124. See id. at 93,541.
125. 680 F.2d 132 (Ct. Cl. 1982).
126. See id. at 140.
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unenforceable.127
2. The Revision Exceeds the CAS Board's Statutory Authority
Even if the CAS Board were to correct these procedural deficiencies,
by republishing the revision after the requisite notice and public com-
ment, the Standard would likely still be unenforceable because it exceeds
the CAS Board's statutory authority. Regulations have the force and ef-
fect of law only when they are promulgated pursuant to a statutory grant
of authority.' 8 Congress has expressly limited the authority of the cur-
rent CAS Board, as it did the authority of the original Board, to matters
of cost allocability, and not allowability.129 As the Senate Report ex-
plains:
In considering the functions and responsibilities of the Board,
the Committee concluded that the agencies, rather than the
Board, should be responsible for determining the allowability of
specific costs. In his testimony on S. 2215, the Comptroller
General stated, "We believe it is important to separate the cost
allocability standards and the cost allowability principles. Allo-
cability is an accounting issue and allowability is a procurement
policy issue."
The Committee agrees with this distinction. Accordingly, Sec-
tion 4 assigns only allocability functions to the Board. Allow-
ability and other similar policy issues will be addressed by the
Administrator and the agencies outside the purview of the CAS
Board."'
The Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) Act Amendments
of 1988 specifically authorize the CAS Board to promulgate cost ac-
counting standards for the measurement, assignment, and allocation of
costs, to be used in estimating, accumulating, and reporting those costs.'
Furthermore, it is authorized to promulgate regulations requiring con-
tractors to agree to contract price adjustments to protect the Govern-
ment from the payment of increased costs as a result of the contractors'
failure to comply with disclosed and established cost accounting prac-
127. See supra Part IV.C.1 (analyzing the author's position).
128. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 304, 308 (1979); see also Bowen v.
Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) ("It is axiomatic that an administrative
agency's power to promulgate legislative regulations is limited to the authority delegated
by Congress.").
129. See S. REP. No. 100-424, at 17 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5687, 5703.
130. Id.
131. See Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act Amendments of 1988, 41 U.S.C.
§ 422(f)(1) (1994); S. REP. No. 101-204, at 16.
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tices, applicable standards, or as a result of their voluntary accounting
changes.12 The so-called "segment closing" provision of the new CAS
413 goes well beyond this statutory authorization. It is neither a "cost
accounting standard" nor a regulation designed to recover "increased
costs" the United States has paid.
Unlike a cost accounting standard, the new segment closing adjustment
provision of CAS 413.50(c)(12) does not regulate the measurement, as-
signment, or allocation of pension costs. In fact, the new provision has
nothing to do with costs. At least in those circumstances where surplus
pension assets have resulted from unanticipated earnings growth or other
increases in asset value, the segment closing provision has to do with the
calculation and recapture of income attributable to previously allocated
pension costs.'33 In essence, the new segment closing adjustment provi-
sion creates an omnipotent, CAS-version of the FAR Credits provision'
3 4
that purports to require contract cost and price adjustments to "credit"
the Government with its "equitable share" of the income earned on pen-
sion plan assets.
The new segment closing provision also exceeds the authority granted
by 41 U.S.C. § 422(h) because it requires a contract adjustment in the ab-
sence of any noncompliance with applicable Standards or change in ac-
counting practices. A "cost accounting practice" is defined as "any dis-
closed or established accounting method or technique which is used for
allocation of cost to cost objectives, assignment of cost to cost accounting
periods, or measurement of cost."' 35 A "change to a cost accounting
practice" is defined as "any alteration in a cost accounting practice,"
other than the "initial adoption of a cost accounting practice" or "partial
or total elimination of a cost or the cost of a function."'36 The accounting
associated with a segment closing is not a change to a cost accounting
practice.'37 Indeed, the CAS Board's illustrations of changes that do not
meet the definition of a change to a cost accounting practice expressly
provide that the elimination of a segment is not a cost accounting prac-
tice change."'
132. See 41 U.S.C. § 422(h)(1)(B); S. REP. No. 100-424, at 23.
133. Where there is a shortfall of assets in relation to liabilities (for whatever reason),
and the Government must, therefore, make up its share of the shortfall, this exercise like-
wise has nothing to do with the measurement, assignment, or allocation of costs.
134. See 48 C.F.R. § 31.201-5 (1998).
135. Id. § 9903.302-1.
136. Id. § 9903.302-2.
137. See id.
138. See id. § 9903.302-4(e). The illustration is as follows:
Description: A contractor eliminates a segment that was operated for the pur-
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Nor would any government claim under the new CAS 413 be seeking
"increased costs" paid as that term is currently defined. 139 Consistent
with the underlying Congressional objectives, the CAS Board has inter-
preted the term "increased costs paid" as follows:
(a)Increased costs [paid] shall be deemed to have resulted
whenever the cost paid by the Government results from a
change in a contractor's cost accounting practices or from fail-
ure to comply with applicable Cost Accounting Standards, and
such cost is higher than it would have been had the practices not
been changed or applicable Cost Accounting Standards com-
plied with.
(b)If the contractor under any fixed-price contract, including a
firm fixed-price contract, fails during contract performance to
follow its cost accounting practices or to comply with applicable
Cost Accounting Standards, increased costs are measured by
the difference between the contract price agreed to and the con-
tract price that would have been agreed to had the contractor
proposed in accordance with the cost accounting practices used
during contract performance. The determination of the con-
tract price that would have been agreed to will be left to the
contracting0 parties and will depend on the circumstances of
each case.
Under the new segment closing provision of CAS 413, however, a con-
tract adjustment is required even though the contractor has fully com-
plied with all applicable Standards and its disclosed and established cost
accounting practices, and has consistently estimated and accumulated its
pension costs in accordance with those practices."' Hence, the adjust-
ment is unrelated to the statutory concept of "increased costs" paid and
is, therefore, not authorized by the statute.
Nor does the Cost Accounting Standards clause authorize the CAS
413-50(c)(12) adjustment. That clause requires the contractor to, inter
alia, (1) "[a]gree to an equitable adjustment... if the contract cost is af-
fected by a [mandatory or mutually agreed-to] change" to the contrac-
pose of doing research for development of products related to nuclear energy.
Accounting treatment: The projects and expenses related to nuclear energy proj-
ects have been terminated. No transfer of these projects and no further work in
this area is planned. This is an elimination of cost and not a change in cost ac-
counting practice.
Id.
139. See id. § 9903.306(a).
140. Id. § 9903.306(a), (b).
141. See id. § 9904.413-50(c)(12).
142. See id. § 52.230-2.
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tor's cost accounting practices, and (2) "[a]gree to an adjustment of the
contract price or cost allowance, as appropriate, if the Contractor or a
subcontractor fails to comply with an applicable Cost Accounting Stan-
dard, or to follow any cost accounting practice consistently and such fail-
ure results in any increased costs paid by the United States." '43 A seg-
ment closing event is not a CAS noncompliance, a failure to follow
consistently a cost accounting practice, or a change to an accounting
practice. Hence, there is no provision under the Cost Accounting Stan-
dards clause that permits the adjustment of contract prices.
The CAS Board also lacks statutory authority to apply the revised
Standard retroactively or retrospectively. In promulgating the revisions
to CAS 413, the CAS Board explained that "[a]ll adjustments shall be
prospective only," but that "costs/prices of prior and existing contracts
not subject to price adjustment may be considered in determining the
appropriate.., adjustment amount for the computation of costs/prices of
contracts subject to this Standard., 144  Notwithstanding these double-
speak assurances, the revised CAS 413, although perhaps not explicitly
retroactive, is nonetheless quite plainly "retrospective." Justice Story
explained the distinction between retroactive and retrospective almost
two centuries ago: an explicitly retroactive rule is one "enacted to take
effect from a time anterior to [its] passage;' '145 a retrospective rule is one
"which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws,
or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new dis-
ability, in respect to transactions or considerations already past.' '146 Ap-
plying the revised CAS 413 to segment sales that have occured before its
applicability date would therefore be "retroactive"; using contracts
awarded prior to March 30, 1995 to calculate the amount of the Govern-
ment's "equitable share" would be "retrospective." Nevertheless, the
terms are synonymous, and whether called retroactive or retrospective,
the result and legal analysis are the same.47
In essence, the revised CAS 413 uses the pretext of "adjusting" the
price or cost allowance of current contracts to reprice previous contracts
retroactively. Indeed, CAS 413-50(c)(12) expressly acknowledges that
143. Id. § 52.230-2(a)(4), (5).
144. Cost Accounting Standards for Composition, Measurement, Adjustment, and
Allocation of Pension Costs, 60 Fed. Reg. 16,534, 16,557 (1995) (to be codified at
48 C.F.R. pts. 9903, 9904).
145. Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 F. Cas. 756, 767 (C.C.D.
N.H. 1814) (No. 13,156); see also Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 268 (1994).
146. Wheeler, 22 F. Cas. 756 at 767; see also Landgraf, 511 U.S. 244 at 269.
147. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 269 n.23 (quoting 2 N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND ON
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 41.01, at 337 (5th ed. 1993)).
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the required adjustment "represents an adjustment of previously-
determined pension costs.''148 The following example demonstrates the
Standard's retroactivity: assume a contractor has performed a significant
amount of government business over a period of thirty years, and during
that time maintained a defined benefit pension plan for its employees.
Assume further (1) that the plan became overfunded in 1987; (2) until
that time, the pension costs allocated to government contracts accounted
for approximately ninety percent of the total contributions made; and (3)
the accumulated surplus now amounts to approximately $200 million.
Finally, assume that since 1987, the contractor's CAS-covered business
has steadily declined, and it now has a single, $500,000 CAS-covered con-
tract. Because the contractor is no longer actively seeking CAS-covered
contracts, the Government determines that a "segment closing" has oc-
curred under the revised CAS 413, and makes a demand in the amount
of $180 million for its equitable share of the accumulated surplus.149 Ac-
cordingly, the "adjusted" price of the contractor's sole remaining CAS-
covered contract is negative $179,500,000. Clearly the adjustment has
nothing to do with the current contract-it is a "recovery" of the income
earned on costs allocated to earlier contracts. Thus, the CAS Board is
simply wrong; the revision is retroactive, and therefore exceeds its statu-
tory authority.50
As the Supreme Court recently confirmed in Hughes Aircraft Co. v.
United States ex rel. Schumer,5' "there is a 'presumption against retroac-
tive legislation [that] is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence," '52 and stat-
utes and regulations "'will [only] be construed to have retroactive effect
[if] their language [expressly] requires this result.""53  This is a long-
148. 48 C.F.R. § 9904.413-50(c)(12) (emphasis added).
149. The government claim is computed by multiplying the ratio of pension costs allo-
cated to CAS-covered contracts and subcontracts to total pension costs assigned (.90) by
the net surplus ($200 million): .90 x $200,000,000 = $180,000,000.
150. Cf Teledyne Continental Motors (Gen. Prods. Div.) 85-3 B.C.A. (CCH) 18,472,
at 92,785 (1985) (explaining that an accounting change could not be considered "prospec-
tive" within the meaning of the CAS clause where it would be "appli[ed] to an existing
contract, affecting its cost or price whenever the same is finally determined"). The revised
CAS 413 is even more clearly retroactive than the accounting change at issue in Teledyne
Continental Motors, because it not only contemplates application to existing contracts, but
effectively seeks to "adjust" the costs of prior contracts. See 48 C.F.R. § 9904.413-
50(c)(12).
151. 520 U.S. 939 (1997).
152. Id. at 946 (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 265).
153. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 272 (quoting Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S.
204, 208 (1988)).
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standing principle, and the presumption against retroactivity is par-
ticularly compelling in the aforementioned contractor situation because
it upsets the party's contractual rights. As the Court in Landgraf v. USI
Film Products'55 explained:
Since the early days of this Court, we have declined to give ret-
roactive effect to statutes burdening private rights unless Con-
gress had made clear its intent . . . The largest category of
cases in which we have applied the presumption against statu-
tory retroactivity has involved new provisions affecting contrac-
tual or property rights, matters in which predictability and sta-• . 156
bility are of prime importance.
In Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital," ' the Supreme Court ap-
plied this well-settled principle to strike down retroactive cost-
reimbursement regulations the Secretary of Health and Human Services
had promulgated, holding that "a statutory grant of legislative rulemak-
ing authority will not, as a general matter, be understood to encompass
the power to promulgate retroactive rules unless that power is conveyed
by Congress in express terms."158 As was true in Bowen, the statute un-
derlying CAS 413 does not expressly require retroactivity. Quite the
contrary, the OFPP Act does not even permit retroactive regulations.
The Act provides, in pertinent part, that all of the Standards the original
CAS Board promulgated "shall remain in effect unless and until
amended, superseded, or rescinded by the Board pursuant to this sec-
tion."'6 The Act further provides that promulgations of the new CAS
Board "shall become effective within 120 days after publication in the
Federal Register."'61  Read together, these sections prohibit the CAS
Board from retroactively changing any of the original CAS Board's stan-
dards, including CAS 413. Thus, the Act certainly cannot be said to evi-
dence clear and emphatic congressional intent that standards and regula-
tions promulgated pursuant to the Act be applied retroactively.
154. See, e.g., Brimstone R.R. & Canal Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 104, 122 (1928)
("The power to require readjustments for the past is drastic. It ... ought not to be ex-
tended so as to permit unreasonably harsh action without very plain words.").
155. 511 U.S. at 244 (1994).
156. Id. at 270-71 (footnote omitted).
157. 488 U.S. 204 (1988).
158. Id. at 208, 215.
159. See 41 U.S.C. § 4220)(1) (1994).
160. Id. § 4220)(1) (emphasis added).
161. Id. § 422(g)(2) (emphasis added).
162. Cf Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 270 (1994) (requiring clear con-
gressional intent indicating that a statute is to be applied retroactively before a court will
"give retroactive effect to statutes").
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Retroactive application of the revised CAS 413 would also effect an
unconstitutional taking of private property without just compensation in
violation of the Fifth Amendment. 163 Although Congress has broad leg-
islative authority, the Supreme Court has long recognized that the Fifth
Amendment limits Congress from using that authority to take away the
vested contractual rights of government contractors 64 When the Gov-
ernment deprives a contractor of its vested contractual rights, the Fifth
Amendment requires that the government make "just compensation.
1 65
Thus, for example, when the United States took possession of ship hulls
and related work-in-process from a defaulting contractor, thereby ren-
dering unenforceable and worthless the contractor's materialmen's liens
in the incomplete ships, the Supreme Court required the Government to
166compensate the contractor for the value of the property taken.
167
Although applying a more traditional breach of contract analysis, the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and Supreme Court decisions in
Winstar Corp. v. United States168 confirm that the Government cannot ab-
rogate a contractor's vested contractual rights without paying just com-
163. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
164. See Sinking-Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 720-21 (1878) (recognizing that legislative
authority cannot be used "to take away property already acquired under the operation of
the charter, or to deprive the corporation of the fruits actually reduced to possession of
contracts lawfully made," nor to "unmake contracts that have already been made"); see
also Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 351 (1935):
To say that the Congress may withdraw or ignore [its] pledge, is to assume that
the Constitution contemplates a vain promise, a pledge having no other sanction
than the pleasure and convenience of the pledgor. This Court has given no sanc-
tion to such a conception of the obligations of our Government.
Id. See also Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 580 (1934) ("Congress [is] without
power to reduce expenditures by abrogating contractual obligations of the United States.
To abrogate contracts, in the attempt to lessen government expenditure, would be not the
practice of economy, but an act of repudiation.").
165. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (asserting that the Gov-
ernment's taking of private property is a constitutional provision entitling lienholders to
just-compensation under the Fifth Amendment).
166. See id. at 46-49 (holding that despite the Government's sovereign immunity, its
taking of private property requires compensation).
167. Notably, the Claims Court, now the Court of Federal Claims, has expressed a
preference for avoiding constitutional issues if possible. See Hughes Communications
Galaxy, Inc. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 123, 145 n.24 (1992), rev'd on other grounds, 998
F.2d 953 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("While it is clear that contracts rights are property for purposes
of the takings clause, that clause is rarely used if the case can be adequately resolved using
a contract analysis.") Moreover, unlike the Court of Federal Claims, the ASBCA has held
that it has no jurisdiction to grant relief based on the Constitution. See United Techs.
Corp., 95-1 B.C.A. (CCH) T 27,456, at 136,770 (1995).
168. 64 F.3d 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (holding that the Government's taking of
contract rights requires just compensation), affd, 518 U.S. 839 (1996).
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pensation. That case involved a number of failing thrifts, which, during
the savings and loan crisis of the early 1980's, were merged with healthy
thrifts to relieve insurance claims on the Federal Savings and Loan In-
surance Corporation (FSLIC). The FSLIC and Bank Board agreed that
the newly-formed thrifts could treat the "supervisory goodwill" resulting
from the mergers as satisfying part of their regulatory capital require-
ments.1 69 Congress subsequently enacted the Financial Institutions Re-
form, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA),' 70 which re-
quired the newly created Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) to
"prescribe and maintain uniformly applicable capital standards for sav-
ings associations," and prohibited the continued use of supervisory
goodwill to satisfy regulatory capital requirements. 7' The plaintiff thrifts
filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims, arguing that the "government
was contractually obligated to recognize supervisory goodwill generated
by the mergers," and that FIRREA therefore constituted a breach of
contract or, alternatively, "a taking of their contract rights without com-
pensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment.' 7' The Court of Federal
Claims agreed that the Government breached its contracts with the
plaintiffs and the United States appealed to the Federal Circuit.' In its
en banc decision, the Federal Circuit concluded that the Government was
contractually obligated to recognize supervisory goodwill, and that
through FIRREA and its regulations, the Government did not execute
its contractual obligations.17' The court rejected the Government's ar-
gument that Congress's sovereign power to regulate would be impaired
by compelling the Government "'to pay for the results of its actions.''
75
As the court explained, "[m]oney damages, in contrast to injunctive re-
lief, presents little threat to the government's sovereign powers, other
than the obvious financial incentive to honor its contracts.', 76 Further-
more, the court concluded that the FIRREA was not a "sovereign act"
because its "principal effect [was] to abrogate specific contractual rights,"
and the Government therefore was "not immunize[d] ... from contrac-
169. See id. at 1535 (noting the FSLIC's desire that the healthy and failing thrifts
merge to prevent liquidation of the failing thrifts and to protect its own insurance funds).
170. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L.
No. 101-73, § 1, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (codified in relevant part at 12 U.S.C. § 1464 (1994)).
171. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(t)(1)(A), (3)(A).
172. Winstar Corp., 64 F.3d at 1539.
173. See id. The Court, however, did not consider the plaintiffs' constitutional takings
argument.
174. See id. at 1545.
175. Id. at 1547 (quoting Winstar Corp. v. United States, 21 CI. Ct. 112, 116 (1990)).
176. Id. at 1547-48.
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tual liability., 177 The Supreme Court affirmed, agreeing with the Federal
Circuit "that 'the government was contractually obligated to recognize
the capital credits and the supervisory goodwill generated by the merger
as part of the [thrift's] regulatory capital requirement,"' and that because
the Government breached its agreement, it was "liable in damages for
breach.
,178
Just as Congress is precluded from abrogating the contractual rights of
government contractors without paying just compensation, so, too, is the
CAS Board acting under a Congressional grant of authority. Thus, even
if the CAS Board had the requisite statutory authority to promulgate its
revised CAS 413, the Fifth Amendment precludes it from applying that
authority in abrogation of the Government's contractual obligations.
Wholly apart from the clear statutory, contractual, and Constitutional
prohibitions on its retroactive application, there are also compelling rea-
sons of equity that prevent giving the revised CAS 413 retroactive effect.
Both the Court of Federal Claims and ASBCA have long held that the
Government is estopped from retroactively disallowing costs, or retroac-
tively disapproving a contractor's cost accounting practices, when a con-
tractor has detrimentally relied on the Government's acquiescence or
approval of those costs and accounting practices. 9
177. Id. at 1548-49.
178. United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 843, 867 (1996) (quoting Winstar
Corp., 64 F.3d at 1543).
179. See American Elec. Labs., Inc. v. United States, 774 F.2d 1110, 1113 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (stating that "'[t]he Government in certain situations may be estopped from denying
actions relied on by others to their detriment, where such action is within the scope of its
agent's authority."')(citing Breed Corp. v. United States, 27 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH)
80,333, at 85,453 (Ct. Cl. Apr. 4, 1980)); Broad Ave. Laundry & Tailoring v. United
States, 681 F.2d 746, 748-49 (Ct. CI. 1982) (holding that the government is estopped from
disallowing costs where the contractor relied to its detriment on wage determination erro-
neously included in the contract); see also Emeco Indus., Inc. v. United States, 485 F.2d
652, 657 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (noting that "a party who engages in a course of conduct, even
without misrepresentation, upon which another party has a right to believe he is intended
to act or upon which the first party intended him to act, will be estopped from repudiating
the effect of such conduct."); Litton Sys., Inc. v. United States, 449 F.2d 392, 401 (Ct. C1.
1971) (concluding that "In view of plaintiff's long and consistent use of the cost of sales
method with the Government's knowledge, approval and acquiescence, plaintiff was enti-
tled to reasonably adequate notice that the Government would no longer approve the use
of that method with respect to the CPFF contracts."); PACCAR, Inc., 89-2 B.C.A. (CCH)
T 21,696, at 109,080 (1989) (acknowledging that the courts "have been reluctant to permit
either party to benefit from retroactive accounting changes, ... and have taken note of the
'commercial havoc' that could result by permitting the practice in the absence of 'peculiar'
circumstances"); Gould Defense Sys., Inc., 83-2 B.C.A. (CCH) T 16,676, at 82,981, 82,984
(1983) (holding that the Government was estopped from retroactively disallowing the cost
of goodwill); Data-Design Labs., 81-2 B.C.A. (CCH) T 15,190, at 75,172 (1981) (refusing
to permit the Government to disallow retroactively the cost of first-class air fare); Penin-
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3. The Cost Accounting Standards Clause Entitles the Contractor to an
Equitable Adjustment in the Full Amount of the Government's Claim
Moreover, even if the revised CAS 413 were valid and enforceable, the
Cost Accounting Standards clause would entitle the contractor to an eq-
uitable adjustment in the full amount of the Government's claim.18° Sub-
paragraph (a)(3) of the clause requires the contractor to comply with all
CAS "in effect on the date of [contract] award,"'81 and to apply prospec-
tively any changes in its cost accounting practices that are necessary to
comply with a new or modified CAS. 8 In exchange, the clause gives the
contractor the right to an equitable adjustment under the Changes clause
if the contract cost is affected by a change that the contractor is required
to make to comply with a new or modified Standard.' As discussed
above, the March 1995 revisions to CAS 413 are much more than mere
clarifications, and represent a mandatory change under paragraph (a)(3)
of the CAS clause' To the extent that this newly defined "adjustment"
exceeds the amount for which the contractor would have been liable un-
der the original CAS 413, it represents a change for which the contractor
is entitled to an equitable adjustment under subparagraph (a)(4)(i) of the
CAS clause.
186The term "equitable adjustment" is a term of art, and is measured by
the cost impact on the contractor. As the former Court of Claims ex-
sular Chemresearch, Inc., 71-2 B.C.A. (CCH) $ 9066, at 42,052 (1971):
The effect of the audit of appellant's fiscal year 1964 (which took place in May
1967) would place the appellant in a position of being unable to recoup the dis-
allowed expense. We find the appellant relied on its method of accounting to
yield the cost return and profit it expected when entering into the captioned con-
tract.
Id.
180. See Cost Accounting Standards, 48 C.F.R. § 9903.201-4(a)(4)(i) (1998).
181. Id. § 9903.201-4(a)(3) (emphasis added) (noting that "if the Contractor has sub-
mitted cost or pricing data, on the date of final agreement on price as shown on the []
signed certificate of current cost or pricing data.").
182. See id. (emphasis added).
183. See id. § 52.230-2(a)(4)(i) (emphasis added).
184. See supra notes 89-96 and accompanying text.
185. See 48 C.F.R. § 9903.201-4(a)(2). Although the equitable adjustment would not
be available on CAS-covered contracts awarded after the effective date of the revised
CAS 413, it would be available for contracts awarded before that date. See id. Hence, to
the extent the government claim includes pension costs allocable to contracts awarded be-
fore the revised Standard became applicable, the contractor is entitled to an equal and off-
setting equitable adjustment. See id.
186. See, e.g., Pacific Architects & Eng'rs, Inc. v. United States, 491 F.2d 734, 739 (Ct.
Cl. 1974) (explaining that the term "equitable adjustment" is a term of "'trade usage' for
those engaged in contracting with the Federal Government") (quoting General Builders
Supply Co. v. United States, 409 F.2d 246, 250-51 (Ct. Cl. 1969)).
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plained in Bruce Construction Corp. v. United States,'87 equitable adjust-
ments under the Changes clause "are simply corrective measures utilized
to keep a contractor whole," and the measure of damages, therefore, is
"closely related to and contingent upon the altered position in which the
contractor finds himself by reason of the modification." ' Moreover,
even if the change does not cause the contractor to incur increased costs,
where the Government deprives the contractor of something of value,
the ASBCA has found the contractor entitled to the value of the asset
taken. 9
The same equitable adjustment principles apply when the dispute in-
volves accounting changes. For example, in Ford Aerospace & Commu-
nications Corp.,19° the Government directed Ford to change its allocation
of general and administrative (G&A) costs from a value-added cost input
base to a total cost input base in order to comply with the newly promul-
gated CAS 410.9! As a result of making the change, Ford recovered sub-
stantially less G&A costs than it had anticipated it would in estimating
and pricing a large fixed-price contract.' 9' The ASBCA concluded that
Ford's value-added cost input base was in compliance with CAS 410, and
the government-directed accounting change amounted to a constructive
change to the contract.9 The Board, therefore, held that Ford was enti-
tled to an equitable adjustment, measured pursuant to the parties' stipu-
lation - by the amount the contract was underpriced. 94
Because the CAS clause expressly provides for an equitable adjust-
ment under the Changes clause, the amount of the equitable adjustment
is the same whether measured under the CAS clause or the Changes
clause. Accordingly, the measure of the equitable adjustment to which
the contractor is entitled would be the amount by which the "adjust-
ment" required under the revised CAS 413 exceeds the amount for
which the contractor would have been liable under the original CAS 413;
that is, the amount by which the change has increased the contractor's
187. 324 F.2d 516 (Ct. C1. 1963).
188. Id. at 518 (holding that the purpose of equitable adjustments is to protect the con-
tractor against increased costs resulting from contract modification).
189. See Norcoast Constructors, Inc. 72-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 9699, at 45,284-85 (1972)
(concluding that in a dispute over ownership of fuel storage tanks used during contract
performance, the contractor was entitled to the value of the tanks the Government had
seized).
190. 83-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 16,813 (1983).
191. See id. at 83,628-29.
192. See id.
193. See id. at 83,629.
194. See id. at 83,630.
1170 [Vol. 48:1139
Government Claims to Surplus Pension Assets
cost of performing the contracts subject to adjustment. The fact that this
equitable adjustment would effectively eviscerate the new CAS 413 is of
no matter; it merely confirms that the equitable adjustment is properly
measured because it returns both parties to the position they were in
prior to the change.9
V. GOVERNMENT CLAIMS UNDER THE FAR COST PRINCIPLES
A. Computing the "Government's share" Under the Cost Principles
The circumstances that can trigger a government claim to surplus pen-
sion assets under the FAR cost principles, until recently, have been far
more limited than those under CAS 413-50(c)(12). Before September
20, 1989, only the actual reversion of pension plan assets to the contractor
gave rise to any government entitlement. In NI Industries, Inc.,'" the
ASBCA held that the Credits provision gave the Government the right
to share in the reversion of funds resulting from the termination of a con-
tractor's overfunded defined benefit pension plan, but only to the extent
that the reversion corresponded to government payments made (1) un-
der open cost-reimbursement and flexibly priced contracts and (2) under
closed cost-reimbursement contracts for which the contractor executed
an assignment to the Government of refunds, rebates and credits, as re-
quired by the Allowable Cost, Fee & Payment clause.' 97
In reaching this result, the Board found that the Credits provision, the
Allowable Cost, Fee and Payment clause applicable to cost-reimbursement
contracts, and the Incentive Price Revision clause contained in fixed-
price-incentive contracts, obligated the contractor to share any refunds
stemming from costs for which the Government had reimbursed the con-
tractor. 98 Where a contract has not been "closed," the Board explained,
these clauses preserve the Government's right to adjust the price or cost
of the contract to account for any refunds or credits received by the con-
tractor, which are attributable to costs for which the Government has
reimbursed it.'99 On the other hand, under "closed" contracts, where the
195. Consistently, in Winstar Corp., the Supreme Court rejected the Government's
argument that the damages the plaintiff thrifts sought would effectively exempt them from
FIRREA. See United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 881-82 (1991).
196. 92-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 24,631 (1991).
197. See id. at 122,912-15. Notably, because NI Industries terminated its plan in 1983,
prior to the 1989 amendment to the FAR, FAR 31.205-60)(4) had no effect upon the
Board's consideration of the case.
198. See id. at 122,914-15 (holding that the Credits provision requires the contractor to
credit to the Government any reversion costs under flexible, open contracts).
199. See id.
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work has been completed and final payment has been made, the Gov-
ernment's right to a share of the reversion is based upon the contractor's
execution of an assignment to the Government of refunds, rebates, or
credits, pursuant to the Allowable Cost, Fee and Payment clause.2 01
For contracts awarded on or after September 29, 1989, FAR 31.205-
6(j)(4) and the former Termination of Defined Benefit Pension Plans
clause (now called the Pension Adjustments and Asset Reversions clause),
which purportedly applies whether the contract is open or closed, broad-
ens the circumstances that can trigger a Government claim, from actual
reversions of plan assets to either actual or constructive reversions. ' This
revision expands the reach of the Government's share to contracts and
subcontracts subject to the FAR cost principles and those for which the
contractor has submitted cost or pricing data.2  Accordingly, the Gov-
ernment may assert a claim under contracts, such as firm-fixed-price con-
tracts, that do not incorporate the FAR cost principles. An amendment,
effective August 22, 1991, further broadens the circumstances that can
trigger a Government claim, to include the transfer of pension assets to
another employee benefit plan fund without the contractor's first having
entered into an advance agreement, even if the assets remain in a trust
for the exclusive benefit of employees and their beneficiaries, and nei-
ther actually nor constructively revert to the contractor.
With the revision that took effect on December 29, 1998, the FAR cost
principles may now cover an even wider variety of triggering events than
the segment closing provisions of CAS 413.50(c)(12). For contracts
awarded on or after that date, a pension adjustment is required when
there is a segment closing, pension plan termination, or curtailment of
benefits, and in "all other situations where assets revert to the Contrac-
tor, or such assets are constructively received by it for any reason.
'' °
The first three events are the same as those covered by CAS
413.50(c)(12): the Government's "equitable share" under FAR 31.205-
6(j)(4)(i) is computed in the same manner as it is under CAS 413, except
that "[f]or contracts and subcontracts that are not subject to CAS" the
numerator of the fraction is "the sum of the pension plan costs allocated
to all non-CAS-covered contracts and subcontracts that are subject to
[FAR] Subpart 31.2 or for which [the contractor submitted] cost or pric-
200. See id. at 122,915.
201. See 48 C.F.R. § 31.205-60)(4) (1998).
202. See id.; see also § 31.201-1(a).
203. See id. § 31.205-6(j)(3)(v).
204. 63 Fed. Reg. 58,594, 58,598 (1998) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. pts. 6, 24, 33, 52).
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ing data."20 5 For the "other situations" where assets either revert to or
are constructively received by the contractor, FAR 31.205-6(j)(4)(ii) pro-
vides that:
[T]he contractor shall, at the Government's option, make a re-
fund or give a credit to the Government for its equitable share
of the gross amount withdrawn. The Government's equitable
share shall reflect the Government's participation in pension
costs through those contracts for which cost or pricing data
were submitted or that are subject to Subpart 31.2. Excise taxes
on pension plan asset reversions or withdrawals under this
paragraph (j)(4)(ii) are unallowable in accordance with 31.205-
41(b)(6).2 °6
Curiously, however, the December 1998 revision deletes the sentence
in subparagraph (j)(3)(v), saying that the "withdrawal of assets from a
pension fund and transfer to another employee benefit plan fund" with-
out advance agreement is deemed a constructive withdrawal and receipt
of those funds by the contractor under paragraph 0)(4).2o7 In its place is
added a far more limited provision: "If the withdrawal of assets from a
pension fund is a plan termination under ERISA, the provisions of para-
graph 0)(4) of this subsection apply. 2 s Because paragraph (j)(4)(i) gov-
erns plan terminations, and because employers generally cannot with-
draw pension assets from a pension fund without terminating the plan
(except to make IRC section 420 transfers), it is unclear when, if ever,
31.205-6(j)(4)(ii) applies. The term "constructively received" is not de-
fined in the FAR. It is, however, a term frequently used in the tax laws,
and in that context is commonly understood to mean income subject to
the "unfettered control" of the taxpayer. Without a plan termination,
205. Id. In other words, the CAS 413.50(c)(12) equation is modified as follows:
{(aggregate amount of pension costs allocated during a representative period of
years to all non-CAS-covered contracts and subcontracts that are subject to FAR
Subpart 31.2 or for which the contractor submitted cost or pricing data) /(divided
by) (pension costs assigned during the same representative period of years)) x
(times) (surplus - (minus) excise taxes) = (equals)(government share of total).
See id.
206. See id. (emphasis added).
207. 48 C.F.R. § 31.205-6(j)(3)(v) (emphasis added).
208. 63 Fed. Reg. at 58,598.
209. See Hornung v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 428, 434 (1967) (explaining that "[t]he ba-
sis of constructive receipt is essentially unfettered control by the recipient"); see also 26
C.F.R. § 1.451-2(a) (1998):
Income although not actually reduced to a taxpayer's possession is constructively
received by him in the taxable year during which it is credited to his account, set
apart for him, or otherwise made available so that he may draw upon it at any
time, or so that he could have drawn upon it during the taxable year if notice of
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the funds remain in trust and cannot lawfully be removed. Hence, absent
a plan termination, the contractor would neither actually nor construc-
tively receive any of the pension funds.
B. Limitations on Government Claims Under the Cost Principles
Similar to CAS 413, there are significant limitations on any claim of
government entitlement based upon the FAR cost principles. Most sig-
nificantly, the applicable FAR cost principles are those in effect at the
time of contract award, and the FAR Council, like the CAS Board, lacks
authority to change the cost principles retroactively. Each of the clauses
that incorporates the FAR cost principles also expressly states that the
cost principles incorporated are those in effect at the time of contract
award.2 Furthermore, the cost principles in effect at the time of contract
award continue to apply for the life of the contract, even if the contract
contains options that are exercised after amendment of the cost princi-
ples." As a matter of both logic and contract interpretation, it is a nec-
essary corollary to the principle that the applicable cost principles are
those in effect at the time of contract award that later amendments to the
cost principles do not apply retroactively. Furthermore, as discussed
above, regulations are presumed not to apply retroactively unless both
the underlying statute and the regulatory language expressly require that
result.2"3
The Administrator of OFPP promulgates the FAR pursuant to the
authority contained in Section 6 of the OFPP Act. Nothing in the Act
intention to withdraw had been given. However, income is not constructively re-
ceived if the taxpayer's control of its receipt is subject to substantial limitations
or restrictions.
Id.
210. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.451-2(a) (giving an example of how bonus stock credited to em-
ployees, but unavailable to them, is not "received").
211. See supra notes 20-22; see also 48 C.F.R. § 252.243-7001 (explaining that "[w]hen
costs are a factor in any price adjustment under this contract, the contract cost principles
and procedures in FAR part 31 and DFARS Part 231, in effect on the date of this contract,
apply."); Boeing Aerospace Operations, Inc., 94-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 26,802, at 133,281 n.4
(1994) (recognizing that the CAS Board will rely on the regulations in effect at the time of
contract performance when the contract is performed before the effective date of the
amended regulations).
212. See Boeing Aerospace Operations, Inc., 94-2 B.C.A. (CCH) at 133,281 n.4.
213. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 269-71 (1994) (stating that a court
will only construe statutes and regulations to apply retroactively if their language expressly
requires that result); Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) (con-
cluding that "a statutory grant of legislative rulemaking authority will not, as a general
matter, be understood to encompass the power to promulgate retroactive rules unless that
power is conveyed by Congress in express terms.").
214. See Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act Amendments of 1988, 41 U.S.C.
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either expressly or implicitly gives the Administrator authority to prom-
ulgate retroactive regulations. Not only is there no statutory authority to
apply the amendments retroactively, but the amendments themselves do
not say that they have retroactive effect. Indeed, with respect to the Sep-
tember 1989 revision to FAR 31.205-6(j)(4), there is cogent evidence that
the drafters intended the revision not to be retroactive, because they in-
tentionally deleted the retroactive provisions of the proposed rule in the
face of adverse public comment. The proposed rule, as published on
February 9, 1987, would have added a detailed "termination of defined
benefit pension plans" provision to FAR 31.205-6; this would have in-
cluded several subsections detailing the manner in which the Govern-
ment's "equitable share" would be calculated. Of particular interest, the
proposed paragraph (j)(4)(ii) would have provided that:
The Government's share of the adjustment of prior periods'
pension costs, calculated for each segment in accordance with
paragraph (j)(4)(i) of this section, shall be the product of such
adjustment (net of any amount prefunded) and the ratio of pen-
sion expense absorbed by all Government contracts and sub-
contracts (including Foreign Military Sales) to total pension
costs incurred during the 10-year period preceding the date of
plan termination, or the period from the inception date of the
plan being terminated, whichever is shorter.215
Confirming that they initially intended the provision to be retroactive,
the drafters' comments explained that the drafters designed the proposed
provision to "serve as a 'trigger' to initiate the process of sharing the pro-
ceeds of a termination on a basis proportionate to the amount of pension
costs absorbed by all Government contracts, competitive and noncom-
petitive, fixed price and cost reimbursement types, and small purchases
and major purchases., 216 Nevertheless, as a result of the public com-
ments, the drafters dropped the retroactive provision and all of the de-
tailed subsections from the final rule.2 17 Hence, the regulatory history
confirms that the drafters of the new paragraph (j)(4) focused on the is-
sue of retroactivity and decided against it.
218
§ 405 (1994); see also Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act Amendments of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-679, § 26, 102 Stat. 4055, 4055 (1988) (amending Section 6 of the OFPP
Act).
215. 52 Fed. Reg. 4082, 4086 (1987) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. pts. 9, 52) (proposed
Feb. 9, 1987) (emphasis added).
216. Id. at 4085.
217. See 54 Fed. Reg. 34,750, 34,750 (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. pts. 4, 9, 12, 15, 19, 22,
23, 25, 27, 28, 31, 32, 42, 45, 52, 53) (1989).
218. See id.; cf. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 255-56 (reasoning that because the retroactivity
provisions of the first Act proved controversial and resulted in a presidential veto, "[t]he
1999] 1175
Catholic University Law Review
Thus, contrary to the position suggested in the Defense Contract Audit
Agency (DCAA) Contract Audit Manual, 219 FAR 31.205-6(j)(4) does
not, and indeed cannot, retrospectively "trigger" inclusion of contracts
awarded before the effective date of the amendment, September 20,
1989. As discussed with regard to CAS 413 above, even if the only con-
tracts to actually be adjusted were awarded after the effective date of the
amendment, using pre-amendment contracts to determine the amount of
the Government's share would improperly give the amendment retroac-
tive effect. Hence, the only contracts that may be used in determining
the Government's share under FAR 31.205-6(j)(4) are those awarded af-
ter September 20, 1989. So, too, the only contracts that may be used in
determining the Government's share under FAR 31.205-60)(4) as re-
vised, effective December 29, 1998, are those contracts awarded on or af-
ter that date.
Many contractors with significantly overfunded pension plans ceased
making contributions before the 1989 amendment took effect. For those
contractors, the sole basis for any government claim of entitlement, at
least with regard to any contracts to which the contractor allocated pen-
sion costs, must be found, if at all, in the FAR cost principles and the
Credits provision in particular, as the regulation existed before the 1989
amendment. Nevertheless, there are significant limitations on the Gov-
ernment's rights to share in excess pension costs under the Credits provi-
sion.
First, the Credits provision provides no basis for adjustment of firm-
fixed-price contracts. Indeed, the ASBCA in NI Industries.. expressly
holds that the Government is not entitled to that portion of the reversion
corresponding to fixed-price contracts."' In so holding, the Board spe-
absence of comparable language in the 1991 Act cannot realistically be attributed to over-
sight or to unawareness of the retroactivity issue"); Texas Instruments, Inc., 79-1 B.C.A.
(CCH) 13,800, at 67,620 (1979) (concluding that CASB "had the opportunity to impose
the requirement for ... reporting[,] and estimating costs by individual contracts but re-
frained from doing it when it omitted references to individual contracts from CAS 401 as
promulgated").
219. The DCAA Contract Audit Manual (DCAM) implies that FAR 31.205-60)(4)
"triggers" the Government's right to an equitable share in the reversion attributable to
contracts other than those in which the provision is applicable. DEFENSE CONTRACT
AUDIT AGENCY, U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, 1 DCAA CONTRACT AUDIT MANUAL T 7-
606.3 (1998) ("If a termination results in pension fund assets reverting to the contractor
and the contractor has at least one contract that contains the clause, the government is en-
titled to an equitable share of the reversionary credit.").
220. See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text (demonstrating that CAS Board's
assurances to the contrary, CAS 413 has a retroactive effect).
221. 92-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 24,631 (1991).
222. See id. at 122,905.
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cifically endorses the position the Cost Principles Committee expressed
in the latter's review of DAR Case 85-180: although the Government's
right to a share of the reversion resulting from payments made under
cost and fixed-price-incentive contracts has had adequate support in the
Credits provision and the Allowable Cost, Fee and Payment and Incentive
Price Revision clauses included in those contracts, the Committee
"'knows of no contract clause that provides a right [to] recapture' a re-
versionary credit under fixed price contracts., 223 The ASBCA also notes
that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Logistics fur-
ther bolsters the Cost Principles Committee's belief. In 1986 the Assis-
tant Secretary "directed the military departments, [the Defense Logistics
Agency,] and [the] DCAA to enter into advance agreements ... to pro-
tect the Government's interest in [the reversions] resulting from a pen-
sion plan termination., 24 Additionally, the ASBCA holds, the Credits
provision provides no basis for adjustment of closed flexibly priced con-
tracts, nor closed cost-reimbursement contracts for which the Govern-
ment has failed to obtain an assignment of credits. 5
Furthermore, even with regard to open cost-reimbursement and flexi-
bly priced contracts, certain years of the contracts may be "closed" for all
practical purposes, because the parties already have negotiated final indi-
rect cost rates. By definition, final indirect cost rates are rates "estab-
lished and agreed upon by the Government and the contractor as not
subject to change.,226 In other words, by establishing final indirect cost
rates, the cognizant administrative contracting officer unconditionally
agrees that the rates are final and not subject to adjustment, whether un-
der the Credits provision or any other cost principle.227
223. Id. DAR Case 85-180 led to promulgation of the 1989 changes to the compensa-
tion for personal services cost principle and FAR credits provision, adding the new section
31.205-6(j)(4), captioned "Termination of Defined-Benefit Pension Plans." See id. The
DAR Council explains that the "'paramount purpose"' of DAR Case 85-180 "'was to pro-
vide contractual coverage for fixed-price contracts."' Id.
224. Id. at 122,906.
225. See NI Indus., 92-1 B.C.A. (CCH) at 122,907, 122,913-15.
226. 48 C.F.R. § 42.701 (1998) (emphasis added).
227. See Institutional & Envtl. Management, Inc., 90-3 B.C.A. (CCH) 23,188, at
116,072 (1990) (under the doctrine of finality, the "Government, like any other contracting
party, is bound by acts of the contracting officer within the scope of employment"); Tele-
dyne Continental Motors (Gen. Prods. Div.), 85-3 B.C.A. (CCH) 18,472, at 92,786
(stating that the government is bound "by agreements entered into by it with the contrac-
tor").
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VI. STRATEGIES FOR AVOIDING, LIMITING, OR DELAYING
GOVERNMENT CLAIMS
Even without making a frontal assault on the validity of the revised
CAS 413, it may be possible to structure pension transactions in a way
that avoids, limits, or at least delays the Government's ability to claim
surplus pension assets. In the 1980s, surplus pension assets helped to fuel
leveraged buyouts: acquiring companies borrowed capital to purchase a
company with an overfunded pension plan, immediately terminated the
plan, purchased annuities to cover vested pension benefits, and used the
remaining pension assets to repay the borrowed capital.2 ' The punitive
excise taxes imposed in 1990229 effectively put an end to this strategy.• • • 230
The September 1989 revision to the FAR cost principles similarly
chilled this termination-and-recapture strategy. The 1990s have seen a
somewhat different, more creative use of surplus pension assets. Some
companies with underfunded plans have acquired companies with sur-
plus pension assets and then merged the acquired company's overfunded
231plan with their own underfunded plan. Other companies have allowed
the seller to keep surplus pension assets as a means of effectively in-
creasing the purchase price for the business unit. 3  Because neither
strategy requires terminating the pension plan or withdrawing pension
233assets, excise taxes are not applicable. Whether these new strategies
228. See generally GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO), REPORT,
TERMINATIONS, ASSET REVERSIONS, AND REPLACEMENTS FOLLOWING LEVERAGED
BUYOUTS (1991) (reporting that in 20% of the 121 leveraged buyouts examined, the com-
panies terminated overfunded pension plans and replaced them with new plans, recouping
the surplus pension assets).
229. See Treatment of Reversions of Qualified Plan Assets to Employers, Pub. L. No.
101-508, § 12002(a), 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. (104 Stat. 1388) 562 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 4980
(1994)).
230. 54 Fed. Reg. 34,750 (1989) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. pts. 4, 9, 12, 15, 19, 22, 23,
25, 27, 28, 31, 32, 42, 45, 52, and 53).
231. See, e.g., Barry B. Burr, GE Sued on Asset Transfer, Aerospace Workers Fight
Funds' Shift to Martin Marietta, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Apr. 5, 1993, at 2.
232. See, e.g., Barry B. Burr, Overfunded Pensions of Value Again, PENSIONS &
INVESTMENTS, Sept. 16, 1996, at 10 (illustrating Boeing's and Keystone's use of such prac-
tices); Dean Takahashi, Loral, Pentagon Settle Dispute Over Use of Pension Funds, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 10, 1993, available in 1993 WL 2362907 (reporting that Loral Corp. used Ford
Aerospace's overfunded pension assets to acquire Ford Aerospace: "In addition to paying
$715 million in cash, Loral allowed Ford Motor Co. to keep $213 million of Ford Aero-
space's pension assets. Analysts said this drove up the cost of the acquisition and allowed
Loral to beat out other bidders."); see also WHX to Start New Fight for Teledyne, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 15, 1995, at D2 (reporting that WHX planned a proxy fight for control of
Teledyne to gain access to the company's pension surplus by merging its own underfunded
plan with Teledyne's plan).
233. See 26 U.S.C. § 4980(a) (1994).
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are an effective means for government contractors to avoid, limit, or de-
lay government claims for surplus pension assets depends on how the
transactions are structured.
As long as there is no segment-closing event as defined in CAS 41334
and pension assets do not actually or constructively revert to the contrac-
tor, 35 the Government has no basis under the current regulations to as-
sert a claim. For example, a company with an underfunded pension plan
could acquire a company with surplus pension assets, merge the two
plans, and effectively use the surplus pension assets of the acquired com-
pany to fund its own pension plan. ERISA permits the merger of pen-
sion plans or transfer of pension assets and liabilities between pension
plans, provided "each participant in the plan would (if the plan then ter-
minated) receive a benefit immediately after the merger, consolidation,
or transfer which is equal to or greater than the benefit he would have
been entitled to receive immediately before the merger, consolidation, or
transfer (if the plan had then terminated)., 236 Provided that all of the ac-
quired company's pension assets and liabilities are transferred to the ac-
quiring company, CAS 413 requires no segment closing adjustment.237
Even absent transfer of all of the assets and liabilities, if the transaction is
structured such that the ownership of the segment does not change-i.e.,
through a merger or acquisition by stock sale of the segment's parent,
where the parent corporation survives the transaction, albeit with new
238stockholders-no segment closing would occur. As well, so long as the
pension assets remain in a pension trust and do not actually or construc-
tively revert to the contractor, no pension adjustment is required by FAR
23931.205-60)(4) or the Pension Adjustments and Asset Reversions clause.
Nevertheless, because the two plans had different ratios of market
value of assets to actuarial accrued liabilities, separate segment account-
240
ing is required for government contracting purposes. In other words,
although the plans were merged into a single plan, in measuring the an-
nual pension cost for its government contracts, the contractor must ac-
count for the plan as though it were still two separate plans, separately
234. See 48 C.F.R. §§ 9904.413-30(a)(20), 9904.413-50(c)(12) (1998); see also supra
note 71 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 209-10 and accompanying text.
236. 26 U.S.C. § 414(l).
237. See 48 C.F.R. § 9904.413-50(c)(v).
238. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (providing an example of such a case).
239. See 48 C.F.R. §§ 31.205-6()(4), 52.215-15.
240. See id. § 9904.413-50(c)(3).
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tracking gains and losses.2 4' As a practical matter, the net result is that
when the contractor begins making pension plan contributions for em-
ployees of the acquired segment, the contributions may not be reimburs-
able under its government contracts, because, based on the segment ac-
counting records, the acquired segment's plan is still fully funded.24
Moreover, if the acquired segment is subsequently closed, or its plan as-
sets revert to the contractor, the Government's claim will be measured
using segment accounting. Hence, this strategy can only delay, not re-
duce, a government claim.
A strategy that may reduce the Government's claim is making a pre-
segment-closing division of the segment's pension plan into separate
plans (either actually or by segment accounting records), one covering
active employees and one covering inactive (retired) employees. CAS
413-50(c)(9) permits "[c]ontractors who separately calculate the pension
cost of one or more segments [to] calculate such cost either for all pen-
sion plan participants assignable to the segment(s) or for only the active
participants of the segment(s). 2 43 If the contractor elects to create a
segment for inactive participants of the pension plan, it must make an
initial, proportionate allocation of plan assets and liabilities to the inac-
24tive segment. Effectively, this permits the contractor to make a one-
time, pro-rata transfer of the pension surplus to the retiree segment.
Thereafter, as employees retire and transfer to the inactive segment, or
move from the inactive segment to the active segment, the amount of
pension assets that may be transferred is limited to the amount of "actu-
arial accrued liabilities[,] determined using the accrued benefit cost
241. See id. CAS 413-60(c)(11) illustrates this concept. The illustration involves the
sale of a segment with the transfer of all assets and liabilities to the buyer. See id. § 9904.413-
60(c)(11). Although a segment closing adjustment is not required, the illustration con-
cludes that separate segment accounting is required: "If the transferred liabilities and as-
sets of the segment are merged into the buyer's pension plan which has a different ratio of
market value of pension plan assets to actuarial accrued liabilities, then pension costs must
be separately computed in accordance with 9904.413-50(c)(3)." Id.
242. Additionally, FAR 31.205-6(j)(3)(v) provides that increased costs resulting from
transferring pension assets to another plan are unallowable unless the contractor first en-
tered into an advance agreement with the Contracting Officer. See id. § 31.205-6(j)(3)(v).
243. Id. § 9904.413-50(c)(9).
244. See id.; see also id. § 9904.413-60(c)(6). Although the contractor may elect to es-
tablish a separate segment for inactive participants (who are presumably no longer work-
ing on any government contracts), the annual pension cost for the active segment none-
theless includes an "allocated portion of the pension cost calculated for the inactive
participants." Id. § 9904.413-50(c)(9). Accordingly, this election does not require the con-
tractor to forgo charging the Government for annual pension costs for the retirees in the
inactive segment. Presumably, however, if there are surplus pension assets, the contractor
is no longer making contributions to the plan.
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method. 2 45 The value of making such an election is that it may signifi-
cantly reduce the amount of pension surplus attributable to the active
segment, thereby reducing the amount of the Government's claim if the
active segment were to be closed. The inactive segment, on the other
hand, could potentially remain "open" indefinitely, provided the contrac-
tor does not terminate the plan or otherwise withdraw plan assets.
Another potential means of reducing the amount of the Government's
claim is to offset the pension surplus by the amount of unfunded Post-
retirement Benefits (PRB) liability attributable to the segment. Until
implementation of the Financial Accounting Standards Board's State-
ment of Financial Accounting Standards (FAS) No. 106 in 1993, most
contractors accounted for PRB costs on a pay-as-you-go basis. 246 FAS
106 requires that liability for PRBs be recognized on an accrual basis
during the years of service prior to the date when the employee becomes
eligible for benefits.2 47 Since 1991, FAR 31.205-6(o) has effectively re-
stricted contractor ability to accrue (or at least to be reimbursed for ac-
cruing) funds to cover the past-service PRB obligations.48 As a result,
many government contractors have a sizeable unfunded PRB liability.
Although there is currently no CAS provision expressly on point,' 49 the
CAS Board's Staff Discussion Paper on PRB costs opines that it is "equi-
table" to reduce the CAS 413 pension adjustment by the amount of un-
funded PRB liability. In particular, the Staff Discussion Paper states that
it is not necessary to "specifically provide that any adjustment charge for
unfunded post-retirement benefit liabilities may be used as an offset to
any CAS 9904.413-50(c)(12) adjustment credit for overfunded pension
plans," because:
When a segment closes, any adjustment amount measured for
post-retirement benefit plans is to be reported to the parties for
consideration when negotiating the overall settlement of costs
and credits associated with the segment closing. The parties are
expected to negotiate an agreement on the treatment of any
245. Id. § 9904.413-50(c)(8).
246. See EMPLOYERS' ACCOUNTING FOR POSTRETIREMENT BENEFITS OTHER THAN
PENSIONS, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 106, § 2 (Financial Ac-
counting Standards Bd. 1990) ("Most employers have accounted for postretirement bene-
fits on a pay-as-you-go (cash) basis. As the prevalence and magnitude of employers'
promises to provide those benefits have increased, there has been increased concern about
the failure of financial reporting to identify the financial effects of those promises.").
247. See id. at §§ 45-62.
248. See 56 Fed. Reg. 29,124, 29,124-25 (1991) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. pts. 6, 8-10,
14, 15, 20, 31, 32, 36, 39, and 52).
249. See generally, Brian A. Mizoguchi, Post-Retirement Benefits: Accounting for and
Recovering the Cost of Health Care for Retirees, 24 PUB. CONT. L.J. 357 (1995).
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post-retirement benefit segment closing adjustment and the
CAS 9904.413-50(c)(12) pension adjustment that is equitable
based on the facts and circumstances of the particular segment
closing."O
Such an offset seems particularly appropriate and equitable when the
pension surplus arises during the same period and involves the same
workers as the PRB liability, because the "undercontribution" to PRB
costs effectively reduces any government "overcontribution" to the pen-
sion plan.
VII. CONCLUSION
In summary, despite its best efforts to change the rules retroactively,
the Government has little entitlement to contractors' accumulated sur-
plus pension assets. Although contracting officers will undoubtedly con-
tinue to assert and vigorously pursue pension adjustment claims, there
are a number of potential legal challenges. Additionally, with careful
planning, contractors may be able to delay, limit, or even avoid such
claims.
250. Cost Accounting Standard Relating to the Treatment of Costs of Post-Retirement
Benefit Plans Other Than Pension Plans Sponsored by Government Contractors, 61 Fed.
Reg. 49,534, 49,549-50 (1996).
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